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INTRODUCTION
The tide of Supreme Court federalism decisions is fast approach-
ing the shores of Title VII. Over the past decade, the Court has ex-
panded the doctrine of state sovereign immunity and strictly en-
forced limits on Congress's power to abrogate that immunity. As a
result, the enforcement provisions of several federal laws-including
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") ,2 the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA") , and the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") 4-have been dramatically weakened insofar as they apply to
state employers. The current Court's Willingness to curtail federal
legislation,6 and civil rights laws in particular,' raises in stark form the
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Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-664 (2000).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of
the ADA cannot be enforced in private suits against nonconsenting state employers); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (same-ADEA); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(same-FLSA); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (same-Patent Remedy Act). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.
Ct. 1972 (2003) (holding that states are not immune from private suits brought under the fam-
ily care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Deci-
sions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 429-30 (2002) (observing that "the Court has held at least ten fed-
eral statutes to be constitutionally invalid" on federalism grounds since 1991).
' In addition to limiting the enforcement provisions of the ADA and the ADEA, the Court
has also invalidated portions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 13931-14040 (2000), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000). See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613, 627 (2000) (holding
that Congress did not have constitutional authority to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981 under either the
Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is unconstitutional
insofar as it applies to the states). See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by
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following question: Could Title VII be the next victim of the states'
rights revolution?
To help answer that question, this Article examines the most vul-
nerable aspect of Title VII-its requirement that state employers
"reasonably accommodate" the religious practices of their employees
unless doing so would result in an "undue hardship."" If that com-
mand is to be fully effectuated in the future, its defenders will have to
run the gauntlet of the Court's controversial Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, which holds that Congress cannot abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers, but can do so pur-
suant to its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce constitutional rights by "appropriate legislation." 9  The
Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 445 (2000)
(observing that the Court's recent jurisprudence imposes "new and substantial restrictions on
Congress's power to enact antidiscrimination laws").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). The threat to Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provi-
sion has already been demonstrated in one federal circuit. See Holmes v. Marion County Office
of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914, 922 (7th Cir. 2003) (granting rehearing en banc) (holding
that the reasonable-accommodation provision cannot be enforced in private suits in federal
court against nonconsenting states), appeal dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
42(b), (Jan. 20, 2004).
Also susceptible to challenge is Title VII's "disparate impact" provision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (k) (1) (A) (i); seeJoanne C. Brant, The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 767, 793-97
(1998) (contending that there is a "very real" risk that disparate impact claims against states will
be barred); Ann Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, the More You Save: Can the Spending Clause
Save Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws', 46 VILL. L. REV. 1111, 1146-50 (2001) (predicting that "Ti-
tle VII disparate impact claims against states will fall"). But see Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255
F.3d 615, 626-27 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that states are not immune to Title VII disparate im-
pact claims); Crum v. Alabama (In re Employment Discrimination Litig.), 198 F.3d 1305, 1324
(11th Cir. 1999) (same).
9 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-65 (noting the Section 5 limitations on state sovereign immu-
nity); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 & n.ll (1976) (holding that Congress has
the power under Section 5 to abrogate state sovereign immunity, but leaving open the question
whether Title ViI's "substantive provisions" are a "proper exercise" of that power).
The Court's sovereign immunity doctrine, which applies to private suits against states for
money damages, does not affect actions brought against states by the federal government and
does not preclude individuals from suing state officials for injunctive relief. See Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 374 n.9. As a number of commentators have observed, however, those alternative mecha-
nisms for enforcing federal standards are of limited efficacy due to constraints on federal
agency resources and the lack of financial incentives for attorneys to accept injunction-only
cases; see, e.g., Brant, supra note 8, at 770 (1998) (contending that the enforcement of these laws
by the federal government is hampered by a lack of fiscal and personnel resources); Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 143 (2001) ("A dramatic
enlargement of the federal government's enforcement role would create enormous fiscal bur-
dens while raising serious questions about the effectiveness of such an approach."); Sylvia A.
Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN.
L. REV. 367, 398-401 (2002) (citing the federal agencies' poor track record at enforcing federal
civil rights and attorneys' reluctance to take on injunction-only cases); Daniel J. Meltzer, State
Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1016-26
(2000) (citing the shortcomings of injunctive relief, suing state administrators personally, and
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Court's Section 5 jurisprudence, in turn, teaches that appropriate en-
forcement legislation can prohibit "a somewhat broader swath of
conduct" than the Constitution itself, but warns that there must a
"'congruence and proportionality between the [constitutional] injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."'
Finally, the Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence provides the
constitutional baseline against which Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision must be measured to determine if it con-
stitutes appropriate Section 5 legislation.1'
When the reasonable-accommodation requirement was first
added to Title VII in 1972,12 there would have been little reason to
doubt that it was congruent and proportional to the requirements of
the Free Exercise Clause. At that time, the Court's free exercise ju-
risprudence imposed a broad obligation on the states to accommo-
date religion by granting exemptions from generally applicable laws.
13
States that declined to grant exemptions from laws burdening reli-
gious practices were required to satisfy strict scrutiny, 14 a far more dif-
ficult task than establishing an undue-hardship defense under Title
VII. 15  Thus, if anything, Title VII's reasonable-accommodation re-
quirement initially appeared to impose less of a substantive obligation
on state employers than the Free Exercise Clause itself.
In 1990, however, the constitutional baseline shifted significantly
when the Court issued its landmark decision in Employment Division v.
federal enforcement); Post & Siegal, supra note 7, at 451 (finding federal agency intervention
"cumbersome and unwieldy").
10 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (citation omitted).
11 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (recognizing that "Congress can enact legislation under §
5 enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion").
12 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j) (2000)).
SeeWisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (requiring an exemption from a compul-
sory education law and explaining that "there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exer-
cise Clause ... and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of
general applicability"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (requiring an exemption
from an unemployment compensation rule that imposed an "incidental burden on the free ex-
ercise of appellant's religion").
14 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject
is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to free exercise of religion."); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07 (requiring the state
to show that it had a "compelling state interest" and that "no alternative forms of regulation"
would serve that interest); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.").
15 See TWIA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that an employer can establish
an undue-hardship defense by showing that an accommodation would require it to bear "more
than a de minimis cost"). As one commentator has observed, the Hardison standard can be lik-
ened to "something in between mere rationality review and intermediate scrutiny." Vikram
David Amar, State RFRAs and the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 513, 519 (1999).
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Smith.'6 In Smith, the Court held that "the right of free exercise does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law pro-
scribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).""' 7  The Court drew a sharp distinction between laws that
have the "object" of burdening religion and laws that have "merely
18the incidental effect" of burdening religion, and the Court con-
cluded that the Free Exercise Clause does not give religious adher-
ents a "private right to ignore" the latter.'9 In reaching that conclu-
sion, the Court went so far as to assert that requiring states to make
religious exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws
"contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. 20
At first glance, Smith's emphatic rejection of free exercise exemp-
tions would appear to cast serious doubt on the proposition that Title
VII's reasonable-accommodation provision can be considered appro-
priate legislation enforcing the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, in City
of Boerne v. Hores the Court held that another federal statute-the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") 22-- exceeded Congress's
Section 5 powers precisely because it required religious exemptions
in contravention of Smith. And the Seventh Circuit recently became
the first court to extend City of Boerne's reasoning to hold that Title
VII's reasonable-accommodation provision, like RFRA, does not con-
stitute appropriate enforcement legislation. ' That holding was fore-
shadowed in an earlier case in which the Seventh Circuit offered the
following summary of the Supreme Court's decisions: "Smith held that
demands for accommodation.., have no constitutional footing un-
der the Free Exercise Clause," and City of Boerne "held that an ac-
commodation requirement could not be thought to 'enforce' a con-
stitutional norm that does not require accommodation.",
25
16 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (StevensJ., concur-
rin 8in the judgment)).
Id. at 878.
19 Id. at 886.
20 Id. at 885.
21 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000).
23 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (noting that RFRA attempts a "substantive alteration" of
the holding in Smith).
24 See Holmes v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914, 921-22 (7th Cir.
2003) (granting rehearing en banc) (finding a similar lack of congruence of the accommoda-
tion requirement with Congress's purpose in protecting the Free Exercise Clause), appeal dis-
missed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), (Jan. 20, 2004).
25 Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.,
joined by Eschbach, J.) (discussing the Court's religious accommodation jurisprudence in the
course of addressing a challenge to the ADA, which requires reasonable accommodation of in-
dividuals with disabilities); see Holmes, 349 F.3d at 919 ("A requirement of accommodation does
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Fortunately for those who would defend Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision in the Supreme Court, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's assessment is somewhat exaggerated. Despite its sound and
fury, the Smith decision did not overrule any of the Court's earlier
pro-exemption cases, but instead narrowly reinterpreted those cases
in a manner that left the door open to free exercise accommodations
in certain circumstances. Most importantly, the Smith Court indi-
cated that religious exemptions may be necessary when a state makes
available other exemptions from a general requirement.27  This "se-
lective-exemption rule, which has been embraced and expanded by
a number of lower courts,29 could prove critical to the Section 5 issue.
For if rules in the state employment context are often subject to se-
lective exemptions, as the evidence discussed later in this Article sug-
gests, 3 a strong argument can be made that Title VII's requirement
of religious accommodation in that context is an appropriate prophy-
lactic measure.
Moreover, unlike RFRA, which openly attempted to reverse Smith
by restoring a strict scrutiny religious exemption regime covering all
state conduct,' Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision de-
mands only modest accommodations, and applies only when states
act as employers. Accordingly, if a connection between the reason-
able-accommodation provision and the Court's selective exemption
rule can be established, the case for congruence and proportionality
will be considerably stronger than it was in City of Boerne
not 'enforce' the free exercise clause ... for Smith holds that a state complies with the free ex-
ercise clause by maintaining neutrality toward religiously motivated practices" and accommoda-
tion is a "departure from neutrality.").
26 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82, 884 (1990).
27 Id. at 884; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
537 (1993) (requiring a "'compelling reason'" when government does not extend exemptions
to "'"religious hardship"'" (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 584)).
28 This Article uses the term "selective-exemption rule," rather than the more commonly
used "individualized-exemption rule," because there is considerable debate as to whether the
rule is limited to situations when the government permits individualized exemptions or also
covers situations where the government has made categorical exemptions. See infra Part IV.B.1.
In either case, the government has engaged in some degree of selectivity among exemptions.
Hence, the use of the term "selective-exemption rule."
29 See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
364-66 (3d Cir. 1999); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 885-86 (D. Md. 1996).
30 See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
31 SeeCity of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-16 (1997).
S2 In defending RFRA, the respondent in City of Boerne did not rely on the selective-
exemption rule and instead argued that RFRA "prevents and remedies laws which are enacted
with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices." Id. at 529. As dis-
cussed below, a similar argument has been made in support of Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision, but that argument is not likely to prevail in the Supreme Court. See
infra Part [V.A.
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This Article develops the argument that Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision is appropriate enforcement legislation and
discusses how that argument implicates a number of unresolved ques-
tions concerning the Court's recent free exercise and Section 5 deci-
sions. However, the purpose of this Article is not to challenge the ba-
sic premises of those decisions-that ground has been more than
adequately covered elsewhere.33 Rather, the focus here will be on
how, within the broad confines of the Court's current jurisprudence,
a state sovereign immunity challenge to Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision should be resolved.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the reasonable-
accommodation provision and explains how the Court has inter-
preted that provision as affording religious adherents limited, but not
insubstantial, protection from generally applicable workplace rules.
Also discussed is the proposed Workplace Religious Freedom Act
("WRFA"), a measure that would amend Title VII to strengthen the
reasonable-accommodation requirement. Part II turns to the Court's
free exercise jurisprudence and concentrates on the issue of when re-
ligious accommodations may still be required by the Constitution in
the wake of Smith. Part III provides background on two branches of
the Court's federalism jurisprudence-state sovereign immunity and
limited Section 5 power-that together make it necessary to establish
a sufficiently close connection between Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision and the Free Exercise Clause.
The task of determining whether the requisite connection exists is
taken up in Part IV. Part V.A explains why, notwithstanding the rea-
soning of one lower court,34 the Supreme Court is unlikely to uphold
the reasonable-accommodation provision on the ground that it tar-
gets intentional discrimination. Part IV.B then turns to the more
promising argument that the Court should uphold the reasonable-
33 For critiques of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence, see Church of the Luhumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559-77 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment); Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891-903 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 SUP. CT. REv. 1; and Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism].
For critiques of the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence, see Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376-89 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Colker & Brudney, supra
note 9; Phillip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Feder-
alism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, Insti-
tutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REV. 153 (1997)
[hereinafter McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation]; Post & Siegel, supra note 7.
See Holmes v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 184 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834-36
(S.D. Ind. 2002), vacated by Endres v. Ind. State Police, 334 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2003), panel opin-
ion revised, judgment vacated, and reh'g en banc granted, Holmes v. Marion County Office of Family
& Children, 349 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 42(b), (Jan. 20, 2004).
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accommodation provision under Section 5 because it sufficiently
overlaps with the Court's selective-exemption rule. Consideration of
that argument would provide the Court with an opportunity to:
(1) clarify the breadth of the selective-exemption rule, which has
been interpreted in different ways by different lower courts;35
(2) demonstrate how it will handle close cases under the congruence-
and-proportionality test, which requires in vague terms that there be
"reason to believe" that "many" of the state actions affected by Sec-
tion 5 legislation have a "significant likelihood" of being unconstitu-
tional;36 and (3) resolve the internal inconsistencies in its Section 5
jurisprudence concerning the role of legislative history. 7 After exam-
ining each of those issues, Part IV concludes that the Court can and
should uphold the reasonable-accommodation provision as appropri-
ate legislation enforcing the Free Exercise Clause.
Part V highlights the very real possibility that the Court would
fracture along several different lines if confronted with a state em-
ployer challenge to Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision.
The Court remains deeply divided over both the validity of the sover-
eign immunity doctrine and the merits of Smith, and the lineup of
Justices on those two issues differs. In addition, some members of the
Court may believe that the reasonable-accommodation provision
raises Establishment Clause concerns, while yet others may be in-
clined to treat Title VII's requirements with special solicitude.
In the end, it is near impossible to predict how exactly the Court
would resolve a state sovereign immunity challenge to Title VII's rea-
sonable-accommodation provision. However, should the Court wish
to avoid a fractured decision that further muddies the constitutional
waters, this Article offers a proposal for upholding the reasonable-
accommodation provision in a manner that brings clarity to the
Court's unsettled free exercise and Section 5 doctrines.
I. TITLE VII's REASONABLE-ACCOMMODATION PROVISION
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate
against any individual" with respect to employment "because of such
'5 Compare Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
365 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the rule applies to situations in which the government makes
categorical exemptions), with Am. Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405,
1408-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the rule does not apply to situations where the govern-
ment makes exemptions that cover "entire, objectively-defined categories").
36 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
37 Compare Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (stating that a "lack of sup-
port" in the legislative record "is not determinative of the § 5 inquiry"), with Garrett, 531 U.S. at
370 (indicating that Section 5 legislation "must be based" on a legislative record revealing a
"pattern of unconstitutional discrimination").
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individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ' As initially
passed in 1964, Title VII did not contain an explicit accommodation
requirement, and it appeared to treat religion no differently than
other protected classes. However, in a 1967 guideline, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") declared that em-
ployers had an obligation "to make reasonable accommodations to
the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where
such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business. " Although that position was re-
jected by some courts as a "fundamental error" that conflated the
"entirely different" concepts of religious discrimination and failure to
accommodate, 4° it ultimately found favor with Congress.
In the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which ex-
tended Title VII's coverage to state employers,1 Congress added the
following definition of religion: "The term 'religion' includes all as-
pects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business., 42 The Supreme Court has since recognized that the "intent
and effect of this definition was to make it an unlawful employment
practice... for an employer not to make reasonable accommoda-
tions, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of his em-
ployees and prospective employees."
4
In two decisions interpreting Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision-TWA, Inc. v. Hardison and Ansonia Board
of Education v. Philbrook45-the Court limited the obligations of em-
ployers in several ways. The most intuitive of the limits was an-
nounced in Hardison, where the Court held that a requested accom-
modation is not reasonable if it would require an employer to
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
39 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968).
40 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 335 (6th Cir. 1970) (issuing an order denying
rehearing), affd ly an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); see also Riley v. Bendix Corp.,
330 F.Supp. 583, 591 (M.D. Fla. 1971) ("'Religious discrimination should not be equated with
failure to accommodate.'" (quoting Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511, 514 (E.D. Va. 1971)),
rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972)).
4 See 86 Stat. 103, § 2(2) (removing the express exclusion of "a State or political subdivision
thereof" from the definition of "employer"); id. at § 2(5) (amending the definition of "em-
ployee" to include individuals "subject to the civil service laws of a State government, govern-
mental agency or political subdivision").
42 Id. at § 2(7) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000)).
43 TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479
U.S. 60, 63 n.1 (1986) ("The reasonable-accommodation duty was inccporated into the statute,
somewhat awkwardly, in the definition of religion.").
432 U.S. 63 (1977).
45 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
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infringe on the rights of other employees. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that TWA did not have to accommodate Hardison's desire
to take Saturdays off for Sabbath observance when other employees
with greater seniority rights would have to work in his place. Less
compelling, but still defensible, was the Court's holding in Ansonia
that an employer can satisfy its duty under Title VII by offering any
reasonable accommodation, even if an alternative accommodation
might better protect the interests of the affected employee. s Consis-
tent with that view, the Court concluded that the Ansonia school
board, which permitted employees to use three days of paid leave per
year for religious reasons, did not have to provide Philbrook with ad-
ditional days of paid leave to fulfill his religious obligations when it
49already allowed him to use unpaid leave for those purposes.
The most significant, and most controversial, limitation placed on
the accommodation requirement was the Court's holding in Hardi-
son, reaffirmed in Ansonia, that "an accommodation causes 'undue
hardship' whenever that accommodation results in 'more than a de
minimis cost' to the employer."50 Applying that rule in Hardison, the
Court concluded that TWA could not be required to pay overtime
rates to find a voluntary replacement for Hardison on Saturdays.5'
Notwithstanding the Court's watered-down interpretation of the
"undue hardship" standard, 2 which the lower courts have applied to
46 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79-81; see also US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403-05
(2002) (reaching the same conclusion with respect to the ADA's reasonable-accommodation
provision).
47 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81 ("It would be anomalous to conclude that by 'reasonable
accommodation' Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preferences of
some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate
or prefer the religious needs of others . . ").
The seniority rights threatened in Hardison were guaranteed by a collective bargaining
agreement, and the Court bolstered its holding by relying on a provision in Title VII that af-
fords special protection to such agreements. Id. at 67, 81-82. However, the Court has since
made clear that Hardison's rationale is not limited to collectively bargained rights. See Barnett,
535 U.S. at 403-04 (relying on Hardison when applying the ADA's reasonable-accommodation
requirement outside the collective bargaining context).
See Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 66-69.
49 See id. at 70 ("The provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between employment
requirements and religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy
days and requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact work.").
The Court went on to explain, however, that "unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommoda-
tion when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones." Id. at 71. Accordingly,
the Court remanded for consideration of Philbrook's claim that the school board permitted a
general category of paid leave to be used for "a wide range of secular purposes ... but not for
similar religious purposes." Id.
50 Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 67 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84).
5 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84-85, 84 n.15.
52 For a critique of the Court's interpretation of "undue hardship," see, for example, Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("As a matter of law, I seriously question
whether simple English usage permits 'undue hardship' to be interpreted to mean 'more than
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preclude most accommodations that impose financial costs on em-
ployers,53 there remains a substantial category of low-to-no-cost ac-
commodations that employers are often required to provide. In-
cluded in this category are exemptions from dress codes and
grooming rules,54 scheduling changes that can be accomplished with-
out overtime pay and without infringing on the rights of other em-
ployees, and approved absences for occasional religious holidays or
special events. Although providing such accommodations could
potentially lead to resentment among other employees, the courts
have largely rejected defenses that are based on "hypothetical morale
problems"5 or "'proof that employees would grumble."' 58 As a result,
de minimis cost'... .); see also Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VIl's Failure to Provide Meaningful and
Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB.
L. 575, 585 (2000) (contending that the Court's interpretation of the reasonable-
accommodation provision "is clearly at odds with [the provision's] purpose").
53 See Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer's Duty to Accommodate Employee Religious Prac-
tices Under Title VII After Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITr. L. REV. 513,
544-45 & nn.101-02, 546-47 (1989) (listing cases demonstrating that "cost alternatives are gen-
eraly no longer available to employees seeking accommodation under Title VII").
See, e.g., Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (requiring
an employer to make an exemption from its no-beard policy); EEOC v. READS, Inc., 759 F.
Supp. 1150, 1160-61 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (requiring an employer to accommodate the wearing of a
religious head covering); see also Brink's to Pay $30,000 to Illinois Woman EEOC Says Wrongfully
Fired over Uniform, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA, Washington, D.C.),Jan. 3, 2003, at A-3; American Air-
lines Settles Bias Claim Brought on Behalf of Muslim Woman, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA, Washington,
D.C.), Sept. 5, 2002, at A-3; FedEx Will Moderate No-Beard Policy to Oblige Muslims Under Consent
Decree, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA, Washington, D.C.), June 20, 2001, at A-2; EEOC Settles Religious
Headscarf Suitfor $50,000, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 27, 2000, at A-9; Mus-
lim Workers Fired for Wearing Scarves Receive Apologies, Payment from Company, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 29, 1999, at A-3. See generally Amar, supra note 15, at 521 (ob-
serving that "the granting of exemptions from personal appearance and dress codes often does
not impose significant costs on employers").
5 See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring an
employer to accommodate Sabbath observance by changing an employee's schedule or allowing
shift trades); Lake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 837 F.2d 449, 451-52 (11th Cir. 1988) (requiring an
employer to accommodate Sabbath observance by facilitating shift trades); Smith v. Pyro Min-
ing Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1089 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d
129, 135-37 (3d Cir. 1986) (requiring an employer to accommodate Sabbath observance by ex-
cusing an employee's absences); Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 958-62 (8th Cir.
1979) (requiring an employer to accommodate Sabbath observance by allowing an employee to
leave at sunset on Friday); see also Amar, supra note 15, at 520-21 ("Authorizing and facilitat-
ing-though not initiating-shift swaps seems to involve little costs and is often required by
lower courts.").
See, e.g., EEOC v. Ilona of Hung., Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576-77 (7th Cir. 1997) (requiring
employer to permit day off for observance of Yom Kippur); Wangsness v. Watertown Sch. Dist.
No. 14-4, 541 F. Supp. 332, 334, 336-39 (D.S.D. 1982) (requiring employer to permit week off
for attendance at the Feast of Tabernacles, a religious festival); see also Court Awards $78,800 to
Convenience Clerk Fired for Refusing Work on Easter Sunday, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA, Washington,
D.C.), Oct. 20, 1997, at A-5.
Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1473.
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th
Cir. 1978)); see also Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("'Undue
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despite the limits announced by the Supreme Court in Hardison and
Ansonia, Title VII still requires employers to provide religion with
"preferential treatment" in "some circumstances. '5 9
The EEOC's guidelines attempt to minimize the special treatment
aspect of Title VII's religious accommodation provision by interpret-
ing it to cover all "moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and
wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional reli-
gious views."60 However, lower courts "have been somewhat reluctant
to embrace the full spirit" of the EEOC guidelines and have generally
"eschewed equating ethics with religion" when applying Title VII.l
That resistance to the EEOC's view is consistent with the Supreme
Court's teaching in the constitutional context that "purely secular"
beliefs, "however virtuous and admirable," cannot be treated as
hardship requires more than proof of some fellow-worker's grumbling .... An em-
ployer... would have to show... actual imposition on co-workers or disruption of the work
routine.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th
Cir. 1978))); Lambert v. Condor Mfg., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 600, 604 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (applying
the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that "'proof of co-workers' unhappiness' with a particular ac-
commodation is not enough to cause a hardship" (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co.,
859 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 1988))).
59 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 219 (Paul
W. Cane,Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996); see Steven D.Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Prin-
cipled Approach to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 742 (1996) (observing
that Title VII requires "special treatment" of employees' "religious practices"); cf US Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) ("By definition any special 'accommodation' requires
the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially.").
In the disability context, Robert Burgdorf has argued that requiring reasonable accommoda-
tion of individuals with disabilities does not amount to preferential treatment because work-
places are inherently designed to accommodate the needs of individuals without disabilities. See
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409, 529-33
(1997). In the religious liberty context, an analogous argument has been made that accommo-
dations ensure equal treatment of nonmainstream religions under laws that that are drafted
from the perspective of the majority. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Cross-
roads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 139 (1992). The "equality" argument for religious accommoda-
tions is complicated, however, by the fact that there are two conflicting equality interests at is-
sue: equality among religions, which may very well be advanced by religious accommodations,
and equality between religion and nonreligion, which is compromised by religion-only accommoda-
tions. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465,
1492-93 (1999) ("Any regime of religious exemptions by definition prefers those whose actions
are motivated by religion over those whose identical actions are motivated by equally deeply
held secular beliefs."); cf Symposium, Religion in the Workplace: Proceedings of the 2000 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Law and Religion, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMP. POL'YJ. 87, 131 (2000) (comments of Professor Vicki Schultz) ("I am not a fan of reason-
able accommodation for anything except disability. Reasonable accommodation is based on a
notion of unalterable difference ... ").
60 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2003).
61 Amar, supra note 15, at 517; see also LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 59, at 220-22
(also noting that "[m]ost courts have eschewed equating ethics with religion").
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religious beliefs." For example, the Court has explained that the be-
liefs of Henry David Thoreau, who "rejected the social values of his
time and isolated himself at Walden Pond," would "not rise to the
demands of the Religion Clauses" because they were "philosophical
and personal rather than religious." 63 Because Title VII, like the Con-
stitution, speaks specifically of "religion," it is best understood as pro-
viding some measure of protection to religiously motivated conduct
that is not available to secular conduct.6
Title VII's special protection of religion may be further strength-
ened by the Workplace Religious Freedom Act ("WRFA"), which has
been introduced in Congress several times in recent years,65 and
which enjoys broad bipartisan support.6 The WRFA would overturn
the Hardison Court's de minimis standard by amending Title VII to
62 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). Notably, the Yoder Court cited to Justice
Harlan's separate opinion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), a case involving a fed-
eral statute that exempted religious objectors from the draft. A plurality of the Welsh Court
concluded that the exemption could be read as encompassing individuals whose opposition to
war stemmed from "moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right or wrong." Id. at
339-40 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan, however, was of the view that the word "religion" is
not "so plastic in meaning that the Court is entitled, as a matter of statutory construction, to
conclude that any asserted and strongly held belief satisfies its requirements." Id. at 352
(Harlan, J., concurring in the result). Instead, Justice Harlan concurred in the result---granting
an exemption to Welsh-on the ground that the Establishment Clause precluded Congress
from limiting the conscientious objector provision to religious adherents. See id. at 356-67. The
three dissenters agreed with Justice Harlan that the statutory exemption of religious objectors
could not be construed to cover nonreligious objectors, but they disagreed with his conclusion
that the Establishment Clause required Congress to extend statutory exemptions to nonreli-
gious objectors. See id. at 367-74 (White,J, dissenting).
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; see also Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833
(1989) ("There is no doubt that '[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.' Purely secular views do not suffice." (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981))); Thomas, 450 U.S. at
713 ("Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its
terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion."); Jamar, supra note 59, at 751 (ob-
serving that a "purely rational, philosophical ethical system, regardless of how moral and central
to a person's life would appear not to meet the [Court's] definition").
rA See Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that the rea-
sonable-accommodation provision "does not require an employer to reasonably accommodate
the purely personal preferences of its employees" and does not cover "employees who wish to
have Friday night off for secular reasons"); Jamar, supra note 59, at 753 ("[I] t is hard to imag-
ine.., that the Title VII prohibition of employment discrimination based on religion was in-
tended to protect an employee's assertion of non-religious, value-based discrimination .. .
See Kaminer, supra note 52, at 628 & nn.371-73 (listing several WRFA bills).
The most recent version of the WRFA, which was introduced in the Senate on April 11,
2003, was sponsored by Rick Santorum (R) and has the following co-sponsors: Evan Bayh (D),
Sam Brownback (R), Hillary Rodham Clinton (D), Norm Coleman (R), John Cornyn (R), Jon
Corzine (D), Larry E. Craig (R), Michael D. Crapo (R), Richard J. Durbin (D), John E. Ensign
(R), Orrin G. Hatch (R),John F. Kerry (D),Joseph I. Lieberman (D), Barbara A. Mikulski (D),
Patty Murray (D), Charles E. Schumer (D), Gordon Smith (R), Arlen Specter (R), Debbie Sta-
benow (D),Jim Talent (R), and Ron Wyden (D). See Bill Summary & Status for S. 893, 108th
Cong. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
[Vol. 6:3
FEDERALISM AND FREE EXERCISE
define an "undue hardship" as a "significant difficulty or expense., 67
That is the same standard Congress used in the ADA's accommoda-
tion provision,6 and it is considerably more difficult for employers to
meet than the Hardison standard.69
A bolstering of Title VII's religious accommodation requirement
would be significant for two reasons. First, it would likely lead to re-
newed efforts to challenge Title VII on Establishment Clause
grounds-efforts that have thus far been uniformly rejected by the
courts of appeals.7 ° Second, and more important for purposes of this
Article, the stronger Congress makes Title VII's religious accommo-
dation requirement, the greater the danger that the requirement will
go too far beyond the demands of the Free Exercise Clause to be
considered appropriate Section 5 enforcement legislation that can
abrogate state sovereign immunity.
In sum, Title VII currently requires employers, including state
employers, to provide some accommodation for religion, and Con-
gress is seriously contemplating requiring more accommodation.
Whether ultimately enhanced or not, Title VII's religious accommo-
dation provision is in considerable tension with the anti-
accommodation trend of the Court's recent Free Exercise Clause ju-
risprudence, and it is that jurisprudence to which this Article now
turns.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND FREE EXERCISE ACCOMMODATION
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has
been made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,7 provides that "Congress shall make no
67 S. 893, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (4) (2003).
68 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000).
69 See Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
the de minimus standard of reasonable accommodation as applied to the ADA, but ruling against
the claimant for other reasons).
70 See EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that
Title VII poses no constitutional problem and noting that "[e]very court of appeals that has ad-
dressed this issue has held that [the accommodation provision] does not violate the First
Amendment"); Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 1986) (same);
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that Title VII
does not violate the Establishment Clause). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Title VII and Religious
Liberty, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 22 (2001) ("Enough cases have been decided since Hardison to
give us reasonable assurance that requiring minimal cost accommodation is constitutionally
permissible. But, that conclusion leaves open the issue of whether requiring more costly ac-
commodations might violate the Establishment Clause.").
71 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("Congress's power to enforce the
Free Exercise Clause follows from our holding in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940), that the 'fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth Amendment's
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law... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.72 Although there is
widespread agreement that this guarantee provides protection from
laws that intentionally burden religious practices,7 3 there is consider-
able debate as to whether it also provides protection from generally
applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practices.
When the Supreme Court first interpreted the Free Exercise
Clause in the late nineteenth century, it squarely rejected the argu-
ment that the government must make religious accommodations
74from generally applicable laws. The Court again rejected that ar-
gument in the middle of the twentieth century, explaining that
"[c] onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious be-
liefs., 75 However, the Court fundamentally changed its approach to
religious liberty in 1963, and for more than a quarter of a century
thereafter adhered to the view that states are indeed under a consti-
tutional obligation to provide religious accommodations.
For example, in the seminal case of Sherbert v. Verner,'6 the Court
held that a South Carolina law requiring unemployment compensa-
tion beneficiaries to be available for work on Saturdays could not be
applied to an individual whose religion obligated her to refrain from
work on Saturdays. The Court explained that applying the law to
the religious adherent would force her "to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand,
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to ac-
cept work, on the other hand. 78 To justify the imposition of such a
burden on religion, the Court held that a state would have to demon-
strate that it had a "compelling state interest" that could not be
served by any "alternative forms of regulation." 79  Likewise, in
Due Process Clause] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.'") (alteration
in original).
72 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
73 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993)
("At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at is-
sue... regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons."); id. at
559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("This case turns on a
principle about which there is no disagreement, that the Free Exercise Clause bars government
action aimed at suppressing religious belief or practice.").
74 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (explaining that a religious ac-
commodation requirement would "make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect. .. permit every citizen to become a law unto himself").
75 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940), overnded on other grounds by W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
76 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
77 Id. at 399-401, 410.
78 Id. at 404.
79 Id. at 406-07.
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Wisconsin v. Yoder,80 the Court held that a compulsory education law
could not be applied to Amish parents who kept their children out of
school for religious reasons unless the state could satisfy strict judicial
scrutiny.8 ' In perhaps the most famous sentence ever written in sup-
port of religious exemptions, the Court concluded that "there are ar-
eas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even
under regulations of general applicability.",
2
Not surprisingly, when the reasonable-accommodation provision
was added to Title VII in 197 2-nine years after Sherbert was decided,
and the same year Yoder was decided-its supporters believed they
were acting in full accord with the Constitution. Senator Jennings
Randolph, the chief proponent of the reasonable-accommodation
provision, explained that the provision was necessary because some
lower courts had declined to interpret Title VII's prohibition of reli-
gious discrimination as encompassing "the same concepts as are in-
cluded in the first amendment." 83 In support of that assertion, Sena-
tor Randolph placed in the record reprints of two decisions in which
lower courts had distinguished Sherbert and refused to construe Title
VII as imposing an accommodation requirement.14  Furthermore,
Senator Harrison Williams stated outright that the reasonable-
accommodation provision would "promote[] the constitutional de-
mand" in regard to "free exercise" of religion.
Senator Williams's assessment would still have been considered
accurate in 1987, when the Court reaffirmed its pro-accommodation
view of the Free Exercise Clause in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission.8 6 The Hobbie Court explicitly rejected the argument that a
state law burdening religion need only be "'neutral and uniform in its
application"' and promote a "'legitimate public interest"' to survive
free exercise review. 7 Instead, the Court followed Sherbert's teaching
that the failure to make a religious exemption from such a law must
be "subjected to strict scrutiny.8 8
80 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
81 Id. at 215 ("The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion.").
82 Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
83 118 CONG. REC. 705, 705-06 (1972).
84 Id. at 706, 708, 711, 713.
85 Id. at 706.
86 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987) ("This Court has long recognized that the government may
(and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices . ..
87 Id. at 141 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1986)).
88 Id.
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Three years later, however, the Court sent a dramatically different
message in Employment Division v. Smith, 9 which held that the Free
Exercise Clause does not require states to provide religious exemp-
tions from "neutral law[s] of general applicability. '" 90 Smith concerned
the application of an Oregon drug law to members of the Native
American Church who ingested peyote during a religious ceremony."
Rather than applying strict scrutiny to determine whether there was
sufficient reason to deny a religious exemption from the law, the
Court applied no scrutiny at all, explaining that when prohibiting re-
ligious exercise is "merely the incidental effect of a generally applica-
ble and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended."92
The Court's decision in Smith appeared to be driven by two con-
cerns. First, the Court expressed doubt about the viability of a consti-
tutional regime that makes "an individual's obligation to obey [the]
law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs,
except where the State's interest is 'compelling.' 93 In the Court's
view, maintaining such a regime in a religiously diverse society would
be "courting anarchy. 94 Second, the Court was troubled by the pros-
pect ofjudges making value judgments about different religious prac-
tices under an exemption regime that requires judges to "weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious be-
liefs."95 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the granting of "non-
discriminatory religious practice exemption [s]" should be left to state
legislatures, not federal courts.96
Had the Court given full effect to its message in Smith by flatly
overruling Sherbert and its progeny, the free exercise landscape would
be relatively clear. Clarity, however, is not a virtue that can be attrib-
uted to the Smith decision. Rather than taking the direct route, the
Court endeavored to distinguish all of its pro-exemption decisions
and, in the process, appeared to create two important exceptions to
its newly announced no-exemption rule.
89 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
90 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment)).
91 See id. at 874.
92 Id. at 878. Smith essentially marked a return to the Court's pre-1963 jurisprudence. See
supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. For a more extensive discussion of that jurispru-
dence, see James M. Oleske, Jr., Note, Undue Burdens and the Free Exercise of Religion: Reworking a
"Jurisprudence of Doubt," 85 GEO. LJ. 751, 754-59 (1997).
93 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
94 Id. at 888.
95 Id. at 890; see id. at 887 ("Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to
the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.'" (quot-
ing Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment))).
96 Id. at 890.
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The first exception covers "hybrid situations" in which free exer-
cise claims are made "in conjunction" with other constitutional
claims.9 7 According to Smith, the hybrid-rights theory explains why an
exemption was required in Yoder, as that case involved both a free ex-
ercise claim and a parental rights claim. Citing other decisions, the
Smith Court indicated that free exercise claims could also be success-
fully hybridized with free speech, free press, and free association
claims.
The second Smith exception provides that where a state "has in
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend
that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling rea-
son."' According to the Smith Court, Sherbert fell into this category
because the unemployment compensation program at issue in Sherbert
permitted beneficiaries to refuse available work for "good cause. '' °
The Smith Court concluded that the "good cause" standard created a
"'mechanism for individualized exemptions"' from the program's
general work requirement; thus, the state could not deny an exemp-
tion to an individual who refused available work for religious rea-
102sons.
The Smith exceptions have been the subject of considerable dis-
cussion in both the lower courts and the legal academy. With respect
to the hybrid-rights exception, the courts have been openly skeptical,
and most have either rejected the theory as nonbinding dictum or
found ways to avoid applying it.'°3 That reticence is understandable.
The notion that an inadequate free exercise claim can be fused with
another inadequate constitutional claim 104 to create a successful claim
has struck many commentators as incoherent.0 5  Moreover, as Alan
Brownstein has persuasively argued, the hybrid-rights theory "has it
97 Id. at 881-82.
98 Id. at 881 & n.1.
9 Id. 881-82.
1oo Id. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
101 Id.
102 Id. (quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 708).
10s See Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and
Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POLY 119, 188 & nn.241-42, 189 & nn. 243-44 (2002) (collecting
cases and observing that the "lower courts have not welcomed the hybrid rights exception with
open arms"); William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or
Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 242 (1998) ("Analysis of hybrid claims
in the lower courts leads to the unmistakable conclusion that the hybrid 'calculus' or logical
interpretation (i.e., two loser constitutional claims = one winner constitutional claim) simply is
not being applied.").
104 In cases where the second constitutional claim is sufficient on its own to require an ex-
emption, the hybrid-rights theory serves no purpose.
105 See Brownstein, supra note 103, at 188 ("The conventional criticism of the hybrid rights
exception ... is that it is intellectually incoherent. To use the crude local vernacular, it just
makes no sense.").
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exactly backwards"--.special exemptions for religious adherents are
least appropriate when other fundamental rights are implicated be-
cause "[p] art of the core idea of fundamental rights is that all citizens
have an equal right to exercise them.' ' 6  In addition, as Brownstein
further notes, it appears that even Smith's author has abandoned his• • 107
support for the concept of free exercise hybridization.
In short, although it may be "malpractice" for lawyers represent-
ing religious adherents not to invoke the hybrid-rights theory,0 8 the
future of the theory is not bright.
By contrast, based on the early results, there is considerable sup-
port for the selective-exemption rule.'09 Not only has that rule been
invoked favorably by the Supreme Court in a post-Smith decision," ° it
has also been well received in the lower courts,"' and has consider-
able support among commentators. 2  Moreover, unlike the hybrid-
rights theory, the selective-exemption rule dovetails nicely with the
general rule in Smith. As noted above, one of the concerns animating
the general rule is that requiring religious exemptions from all laws
could lead to anarchy. However, by requiring religious exemptions
only when states make other exemptions, the selective-exemption
'06 Id. at 191-93.
107 Id. at 190 n.249 (citing watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 171 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If a licensing requirement is other-
wise lawful [under the Free Speech Clause], it is in my view not invalidated by the fact that some
people will choose, for religious reasons, to forego speech rather than observe it. That would
convert an invalid free-exercise claim into a valid free-speech claim . . . .") (citation omitted)).
108 Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the Gen-
eral Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 850, 858 (2001).'09
For an explanation of why this Article uses the term "selective-exemption rule," rather
than the more commonly used "individualized-exemption rule," see supra note 28.
110 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1993).
I See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d. 144, 165-68 (3d Cir. 2002);
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365-66 (3d Cir.
1999); Hale 0 Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1072-73 (D.
Haw. 2002); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 885-86 (D. Md. 1996); Rader v.
Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1551-53 (D. Neb. 1996).
112 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 108, at 860-63, 882-84 ("The Free Exercise Clause has evolved
into a leaner, meaner religious-liberty-protecting machine in the wake of... Smith and Lu-
kumi."); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Con-
stitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1277-82, 1287-90 (1994);
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77,
115-19 (2000) ("Fundamental rights/equal protection analysis makes clear that any law or gov-
ernment action that excuses-by administrative exemption, legislative exemption, or other-
wise-one or more secular activities but not comparable religious practices creates a classification
that impermissibly burdens the fundamental right of free exercise of religion, and thus should
normally be subject to strict scrutiny."); Laycock, supra note 33, at 48-51. But cf Brownstein,
supra note 103, at 193-203 (contending that the selective-exemption rule is "arguably coherent"
if limited to situations where the government makes individualized exemptions, but unworkable
if extended to cases involving categorical exemptions); Volokh, supra note 59, at 1539-42 (con-
tending that the selective-exemption rule is unwise and unworkable as applied to categorical
exemptions).
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rule leaves states with the option of eliminating exemptions alto-
gether if they perceive a threat to societal order."'
More fundamentally, the general Smith rule and the selective-
exemption rule can be read in tandem to stand for the proposition
that the valuation of religious practices by government actors is in-
herently dangerous and should be minimized to the extent possible.
Thus, when a state maintains an across-the-board prohibition that
does not distinguish between religiously and secularly motivated con-
duct, the general rule prevents judges from increasing the risk of im-
permissible valuation by keeping them out of the business of balanc-
ing the state's interest against the claims of religious adherents. By
contrast, when a state permits some exemptions to be made from a
prohibition, but denies a religious exemption, there is a serious risk
that the state has "devalue [d] religious reasons for [conduct] by judg-
ing them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons,""114 and the
selective-exemption rule helps mitigate that risk by imposing a strong
judicial presumption in favor of the religious exemption."'
In short, the selective-exemption rule provides a principled basis
for continuing to require religious accommodations in certain cir-
cumstances notwithstanding Smith's general rule. The availability of
such accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause is relevant to
the fate of Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision because,
as Part III explains, the Court's federalism doctrine requires that
there be a sufficiently close connection between the requirements of
the Constitution and the requirements of a federal statute before that
statute can be meaningfully applied to the states.
113 See Duncan, supra note 108, at 881 ("Under Smith and Lukumi, the majority may rule with-
out any fear of religious anarchy, so long as the burdens it creates are not imposed selectively.").
114 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537-38.
15 Because the selective-exemption rule counteracts state action that threatens to devalue
religion, one could argue that it is not so much an exception to Smith as it is a subset of Smith's
general rule that the government must be neutral towards religion. See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309
F.3d at 165-66 (explaining that state officials "contravene the neutrality requirement if they ex-
empt some secularly motivated conduct but not comparable religiously motivated conduct").
In addition, some courts and commentators have treated the selective-exemption rule as part of
Smith's general applicability requirement. See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1553 (explaining that com-
pliance with the selective-exemption rule is a minimum requirement of fulfilling general appli-
cability); Duncan, supra note 108, at 861 (claiming that the selective-exemption rule should be
understood as "nothing more than a subset of the general applicability requirement"). But see
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532, 537-38 (discussing the selective-exemption rule in a section on "neu-
trality," not "general applicability"); Gedicks, supra note 112, at 116 (arguing that "[n]either
religious neutrality nor the Court's definition of general applicability can account for" the se-
lective-exemption rule).
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III. THE RESTRICTIONS OF FEDERALISM: STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND A MODEST SECTION 5 POWER
In a series of cases decided since the mid-1990s, the Supreme
Court has consistently enforced limits on congressional authority in
the name of federalism. 16 Two branches of the Court's recent feder-
alism jurisprudence are relevant here. The first concerns state sover-
eign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and the second con-
cerns Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Together, the Court's decisions in those two areas have
had the effect of sharply limiting the number of federal statutory
rights that can be effectively enforced against the states.1
7
The Eleventh Amendment provides that " [t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.""" Over the vigorous dissent of four Justices, the current Court
has repeatedly adhered to the following expansive interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment:
Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State
by citizens of another State, our cases have extended the Amendment's
applicability to suits by citizens against their own States. The ultimate
guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting states may
not be sued by private individuals in federal court." 9
n6 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portions of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating the Brady
Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating RFRA); Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (invalidating part of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act); see also Fallon, su-
pra note 6, at 429 ("It seems agreed on all sides now that the Supreme Court has an agenda of
promoting constitutional federalism."); Frickey & Smith, supra note 33, at 1718 ("In the fifteen
years of the Rehnquist Court, the law has changed dramatically in ways limiting federal power
over states and their citizens.");Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J.
1141, 1145 (2002) ("As most people know by now, five Justices of the Supreme Court are be-
ginning to rewrite the map of American federalism.").i17A great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the impact of the Court's Eleventh
Amendment and Section 5 doctrines, largely because of the threat they pose to civil rights laws.
See, e.g., Colker & Brudney, supra note 9, at 131 (contending that the Court has "effectively in-
vited challenges to core civil rights legislation, and states are lining up to claim additional Elev-
enth Amendment immunities"); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique,
Morrison, and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 158-59 (con-
tending that the Court has "created powerful incentives to test the validity of federal antidis-
crimination statutes as Section 5-based legislation"); Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 455 ("The
Court's new interest in constraining Section 5 power.., raises disconcerting questions for the
future of federal antidiscrimination law.").
]i U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
19 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (citations omitted); see
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 ("Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict
only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 'we have understood the Eleventh
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The Court has further held that Congress lacks the power to "ab-
rogate" Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its
Article I powers, but can do so when legislating under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 As a result, a statute that has been val-
idly enacted under the Commerce Clause can only be applied in pri-
vate suits against the states to the extent that it also qualifies as proper
Section 5 legislation.
12 1
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the due process and
equal protection guarantees found in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. At one time, the Court maintained the view that Sec-
tion 5 grants Congress "the same broad powers" in enforcing Four-
teenth Amendment rights as the Necessary and Proper Clause grants
Congress in exercising its Article I powers. In 1997, however, the
Court announced a new "congruence and proportionality" test for
Section 5 legislation, 14 and the Court has already found five federal
statutes lacking under that test. 5 The Court's aggressive application
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it con-
firms.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779
(1991))); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending the sovereign immunity doc-
trine to cover federal suits brought in state court). But see Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 98-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part, joined by Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, JJ.) ("The kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe
[and] Alden v. Maine... represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this Court
that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises."); Michael H. Gottesman, Disability,
Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 40 (2001) ("Historians and
legal scholars have concluded, virtually unanimously, from the language, context, and 'legisla-
tive history' of the Eleventh Amendment, that the Amendment was not intended to insulate
states from federal court suits to enforce federal obligations.").
The irony of the current Court's nontextual approach to the Eleventh Amendment has not
been lost on commentators. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 116, at 1151 ("Once upon a time,
judicial conservatives criticized those who saw in the Constitution words that were not there,
like 'privacy.' Garrett goes one better. Garrett reads a word that is in the Constitution to mean its
opposite.").
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.
1 See id. An additional requirement is that Congress unequivocally express its intent to sub-
ject states to suit in the language of the statute. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73. The Court has already
held that such intent "is clearly present" in Title VII. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452
(1976); see Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (amending the
definition of "person" in Title VII to include "governments, governmental agencies, [and] po-
litical subdivisions"); id. at § 2(2) (removing the express exclusion of "a State or political subdi-
vision thereof" from the definition of "employer"); id. at § 2(5) (amending the definition of
"employee" to include individuals "subject to the civil service laws of a State government, gov-
ernmental agency or political subdivision"); id. at § 4(a) (adding specific procedures to govern
private suits involving "a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision").
122 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
123 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
124 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
125 See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (ADA); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence
Against Women Act); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (ADEA); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
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of the congruence-and-proportionality test has led most observers to
conclude that the Court has significantly tightened the reins on Sec-
tion 5 legislation.
126
The central theme that emerges from the Court's recent decisions
is that the Court will carefully scrutinize Section 5 legislation to en-
sure that Congress has not crossed the line between enforcing consti-
tutional rights and altering those rights. 27 Although Congress has the
power under Section 5 to remedy and deter constitutional violations
by prohibiting "a somewhat broader swath of conduct" than the
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent Remedy Act); City of Boerne, 521
U.S. 507 (RFRA). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (holding
that the family care provision of the FMLA satisfies the congruence-and-proportionality test).
126 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 959 (3d ed. 2000) (con-
cluding that Section 5 legislation has "been saddled with something between intermediate and
strict scrutiny"); Colker & Brudney, supra note 9, at 104 (concluding that the "new framework
impose[s] on Congress a much higher burden of proof in establishing the constitutionality of
its actions under Section 5"); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 61, 91 (concluding that the pattern of the Court's recent Section 5 deci-
sions "suggests that congruence and proportionality is a demanding standard"); Estreicher &
Lemos, supra note 117, at 114 (concluding that the Court "now seems prepared to subject Sec-
tion 5-based legislation to more searching scrutiny in order to protect against congressional
overreaching"); Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 477 (concluding that the Court has used the
congruence-and-proportionality test to impose restrictions "that seem analogous to the narrow
tailoring required by strict scrutiny").
127 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (explaining that it is "the responsibility of this Court, not Con-
gress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees" (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
519-24)). In addition to this "separation of powers" concern, the Court has explicitly relied on
principles of federalism to justify its careful scrutiny of Section 5 legislation. See Morrison, 529
U.S. at 620 (explaining that limitations on the Section 5 power "are necessary to prevent the
Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance of power be-
tween the States and the National Government" (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-24)).
Several commentators have suggested that the Court's narrowing of Congress's Section 5
power is being driven by Eleventh Amendment concerns. See Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 1019 (2002) ("Having held that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity under Article I, the Court does not want to see Congress use the Sec-
tion Five power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, except in a limited domain.") (citation
omitted); Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 117, at 114 ("Because the Court has vested Congress
with more power to restrict state sovereignty-by abrogating sovereign immunity-under Sec-
tion 5 than under Article I, it now seems prepared to subject Section 5-based legislation to more
searching scrutiny. .. ."); Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 512 ("[Hlaving worked so hard in Semi-
nole Tribe to establish state Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits predicated upon federal
commerce power, the Court was not about to cede to Congress free rein to override that im-
munity under Section 5.").
There is also considerable suspicion that other motives may be at work. See Fallon, supra
note 6, at 434, 469, 481-84 (contending that many of the Court's decisions are better explained
by "substantive conservatism" than federalism); Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 522 ("le suggest
that the City of Boerne test is actually a tool for restraining Congress whenever the Court is indif-
ferent or hostile to the constitutional values at stake in particular instances of Section 5 legisla-
tion."); Rubenfeld, supra note 116, at 1144 (contending that "some of the Court's federalism
cases are not really federalism cases at all" and "are better understood as part of an anti-
antidiscrimination agenda").
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Constitution itself,2 Congress goes too far when it passes legislation
that "effects a substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment
right at issue." 29 The Court has acknowledged that the line between
appropriate prophylactic measures and inappropriate definitional
measures "is a fine one,'20 but has emphasized that the "distinction
exists and must be observed."'' Thus, the Court requires that there
be "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-• ,, 1 2
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."
To determine whether a statutory prohibition is congruent and
proportional to the requirements of the Constitution, the Court ex-
amines (1) the scope of the statutory prohibition as compared to the
scope of the Court's own constitutional jurisprudence in the area,
and (2) the legislative record compiled by Congress when enacting
the statute.
In applying the first factor, the Court asks whether "there is rea-
son to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional en-
actment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional." 3'
To date, the Court has not come close to answering this question af-
firmatively, as it has largely dealt with statutes imposing requirements
that far exceed those imposed by its own jurisprudence. 3' For exam-
ple, in City of Boerne v. Flores, ' the Court addressed RFRA,13 6 which
was an open attempt to restore the strict scrutiny religious-exemption
regime that the Court had explicitly rejected in Smith.13 More
128 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 ("Legislation which deters or reme-
dies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress's enforcement power even if
in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional ... .
129 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
130 Id.
131 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
132 Id.
133 Id.; see Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (concluding that the "ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely
to be held unconstitutional"); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) ("[I]t simply cannot be said that 'many of [the acts of infringement]
affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitu-
tional.'" (alteration in original) (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532)).
im In the one case where the Court found that a statutory requirement satisfied the congru-
ence-and-proportionality test, it relied principally on the legislative record factor, not the scope-
of-coverage factor. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1978-1981 (2003)
(discussing the legislative record of the FMLA). Indeed, the Court in Hibbs did not even ad-
dress the question whether many of the state actions affected by the FMLA had a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional, and instead focused on the fact that Congress was con-
fronting a "difficult and intractable problem" that more modest measures had failed to cure.
Id. at 1982 (brackets omitted) (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88).
135 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
136 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
is7 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-16, 532-35; see also TRIBE, supra note 126, at 960 ("Unlike
most § 5 legislation, RFRA was... aimed directly at judicial procedures and rules of decision for
every federal and state court in the nation, and, as if to dare the Court to defend its turf, RFRA
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recently, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents138 and Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett,' the Court confronted statutes pro-
hibiting state actions (age and disability discrimination) that are
rarely deemed unconstitutional because they are only subject to ra-
tional-basis review. 40 In short, the Court has not yet confronted a
case that has required it to provide detailed guidance on the scope-of-
coverage factor. 
41
With respect to the legislative record factor, the Court asks
"whether Congress had evidence of a pattern of constitutional viola-
tions on the part of the States."1 42  However, the Court's decisions
send mixed messages as to the import of the legislative record in-
quiry. In Kime the Court indicated that a strong legislative record
can save a statute that falls short on the scope-of-coverage factor,
143
but it made clear that a "lack of support [in the legislative record] is
not determinative of the § 5 inquiry."' 44 In Garrett, however, the Court
appeared to come to the opposite conclusion when it asserted that
Section 5 legislation "must be based" on a pattern of unconstitutional
state conduct.
45
was written less like an ordinary statute than like an opinion reversing or overruling the Su-
preme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith.").
IM 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
139 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
140 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84 ("States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending
the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest."); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-68, 372-74 (explaining that rational basis scrutiny
applies to discrimination based on disability because negative attitudes and fear alone do not
necessarily amount to constitutional violations).
141 See generally Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 117, at 153 (observing that the Court's juris-
prudence "provides scant guidance for either Congress or lower courts as to the degree of con-
gruence and proportionality required between legislative ends and means"); Post & Siegel, su-
pra note 7, at 510 (observing that "neither Boerne nor Kimel specifies the degree of congruence
andproportionality that will be demanded of Section 5 legislation").
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1978 (2003); see Garrett, 531 U.S. at
368 ("Once we have determined the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question,
we examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment
discrimination by the States against the disabled."); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 ("Congress never iden-
tified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever
that rose to the level of constitutional violation.").
143 The Kimel Court noted:
That the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional, while
significant, does not alone provide the answer to our § 5 inquiry. Difficult and intracta-
ble problems often require powerful remedies .... One means by which we have [de-
termined the appropriateness of such remedies] in the past is by examining the legisla-
tive record containing the reasons for Congress's action.
528 U.S. at 88. The Court recently gave effect to this rationale in Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982; see
supra note 134.
144 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
145 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370; see id. at 374 ("[T] here must be a patter of discrimination by the
States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must
be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.") (emphasis added); id. at 376
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In light of the tension between Kimel and Garrett, it is far from cer-
tain what the Court would do in a case where a statute appears con-
gruent and proportional based on the scope-of-coverage factor, but
lacks support in the legislative record.46  As discussed below, Title
VII's reasonable-accommodation provision might very well present
such a case.
IV. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AT THE CROSSROADS OF TWO
UNSETTLED DOCrRINES
A state sovereign immunity challenge to Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision would present the Supreme Court with a
unique opportunity to resolve some of the lingering uncertainties in
both its free exercise and Section 5 doctrines. Specifically, such a
challenge would permit the Court to (1) address the breadth of the
exceptions to the no-free-exercise-accommodation rule announced in
Smith, (2) give more concrete meaning to its teaching that enforce-
ment legislation is appropriate if there is "reason to believe" that
"many" of the state actions affected by the legislation have a "signifi-
cant likelihood of being unconstitutional,' 47 and (3) explain the role
of the legislative record in cases where enforcement legislation goes
somewhat beyond the requirements of the Constitution, but does not
have the type of "indiscriminate scope" that has troubled the Court in
past cases.
There is, however, one important caveat. The Court need only
confront the unresolved issues noted above if it first rejects what may
be called the "easy" answer to the reasonable-accommodation/
Section 5 question. That answer, which was initially accepted by a
federal district court in the first case to raise the issue, Holmes v.
Marion County Office of Family and Children,149 is that Title VII's reason-
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The predicate for money damages against an unconsenting State in
suits brought by private persons must be a federal statute enacted upon the documentation of
patterns of constitutional violations committed by the State in its official capacity.").
146 The Court has faced the opposite situation. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
619-20, 625-26 (2000) (acknowledging the existence of a "voluminous congressional record"
revealing "pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated vio-
lence," but holding that the Violence Against Women Act is not congruent and proportional to
the Equal Protection Clause because its remedies are "directed not at any State or state actor,
but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias").
147 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
148 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-34 ("Sweeping coverage ensures
[RFRA's] intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws ... of almost every description
and regardless of subject matter .... The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws ... is the
most demanding test known to constitutional law.").
149 184 F. Supp. 2d 828 (S.D. Ind. 2002), vacated sub nom., Endres v. Ind. State Police, 334
F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2003), panel opinion revised, judgment vacated, and reh 'g en banc granted, Holmes
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able-accommodation requirement satisfies the congruence-and-
proportionality test because it is a modest measure designed to en-
force the Free Exercise Clause's undisputed prohibition of inten-
tional discrimination. 5 ° As discussed below in Part IV.A, the easy an-
swer ultimately proves too easy as it cannot be squared with either the
actual operation of the reasonable-accommodation provision or its
legislative history.'5' Accordingly, Part IV.B turns to the more plausi-
ble, albeit messy, argument for sustaining Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision-that it appropriately enforces the free
exercise accommodation requirements that have survived Smith, what-
ever they may be.
A. Reasonable Accommodation and Intentional Discrimination
In holding that Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision
constitutes appropriate Section 5 enforcement legislation, the district
court in Holmes concluded that the provision targets the same "core
injury" as the Free Exercise Clause, that is, "intentional discrimina-
tion.' ' 3  To understand why that reasoning is unlikely to prevail in
the Supreme Court, it is helpful to begin with the Court's analysis in
Kimel and Garrett.
In both of those cases, the Court placed particular emphasis on
the low level of judicial scrutiny that would apply to the challenged
state conduct (age and disability discrimination, respectively) under
the Constitution. The reason for that emphasis is clear: When a
law prohibits state employer conduct that is subject to rational basis
review under the Constitution, the law is almost certain to affect "sub-
stantially more state employment decisions and practices than would
v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), (Jan. 20, 2004).
150 See Holmes, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 836-37.
151 The Seventh Circuit's panel decision in Holmes properly rejects the easy answer. See 349
F.3d at 919-20. However, in doing so, the panel decision fails to discuss much of the district
court's contrary reasoning, including its key assertion that the burden imposed by the reason-
able-accommodation provision is so modest that only employers with "invidious" motives will
fail to comply. 184 F. Supp. 2d at 836. Part [V.A directly addresses the district court's analysis
in Holmes and explains why it is unsound.
152 This argument was not addressed by either the district court or the Seventh Circuit panel
in Holmes.
153 Holmes, 184 F. Supp. at 836.
154 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2000) ("[S]uch legislation
incurs only the minimum 'rational-basis' review applicable to general social and economic legis-
lation."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (noting that the elderly have nei-
ther a "'"history of purposeful unequal treatment,"'" nor are they a "discrete and insular minor-
ity" (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quoting San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)))).
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likely be held unconstitutional.' '5 5 By contrast, when a law regulates
conduct that is subject to strict scrutiny under the Constitution, there
is good reason to believe that the law will prohibit "little, if any, con-
stitutional behavior.'
5 6
Given the importance of judicial scrutiny to the Court's Section 5
analysis, 57 one argument for upholding Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision is that religious classifications, unlike clas-
sifications based on age and disability, are subject to strict scrutiny
under the Constitution. Indeed, the court in Holmes was receptive to
that argument and explicitly distinguished Title VII from the ADA by
pointing out that "' [r] ational discrimination against persons with dis-
abilities is constitutionally permissible in a way that rational discrimi-
nation against religious practices is not."1 58  However, that observa-
tion misses a crucial point. Although discrimination against religion is
subject to strict scrutiny under the Constitution, the failure to make
accommodations for religion is subject to no scrutiny so long as a state is
acting pursuant to a neutral and generally applicable policy.159 Thus,
the issue is not merely one of degree (how much scrutiny), but also
one of kind (what type of state conduct will triggerjudicial scrutiny in
the first place).160
155 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
156 Nanda v. Bd. of Trs., 303 F.3d 817, 830 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding Title VII to be appropri-
ate Section 5 legislation insofar as it prohibits disparate treatment on the basis of race and sex),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2246 (2003).
157 Robert Post and Reva Siegel have argued persuasively that the level of judicial scrutiny
applying to particular state conduct should not play such a large role in the Court's Section 5
analysis, especially in contexts where principles of "judicial restraint" have led the Court to
adopt a rational basis standard of review. Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 462-66. In their view,
Section 5 provides Congress with authority to fill the "gap between conduct that the Court in
principle recognizes might be unconstitutional and conduct that the Court is willing in adjudi-
cation to hold unconstitutional." Id. at 465. The Court, however, appears to have rejected that
position. Compare Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372 (concluding that, even if Congress had found a "pat-
tern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States," the ADA would not be appropriate en-
forcement legislation because the burden it imposes on states "far exceeds" that which the
Court's rational basis standard would impose), with id. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The
problem with the Court's approach is that neither the 'burden of proof' that favors States nor
any other rule of restraint applicable to judges applies to Congress when it exercises its § 5
power.").
158 See Holmes, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (quoting Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945,
951 (7th Cir. 2000)).
5 See Employment Div. v Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (holding that if a prohibition of
religion is "merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision,
the First Amendment has not been offended").
160 See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Reli-
gious Liberty AfterCity of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 104:
The Smith and Flores Courts are best understood as emphasizing a deep point about
the conceptual structure of religious liberty, not simply a view about how much religious lib-
erty is desirable .... The point is this: the only sound conception of religious liberty is
founded upon protecting religious exercise against persecution, discrimination,
insensitivity, or hostility. There is no coherent normative basis for insisting that religious
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That same point plays out when considering a related contention
that is based on the relative ease of establishing an undue-hardship
defense under Title VII. In Kimel, the Court explained that one of
the reasons the ADEA was "'so out of proportion"" to the Constitu-
tion was that its bona-fide-occupational-qualification ("BFOQ") de-
fense provided only ""'an extremely narrow exception""' to liability
for age discrimination. 162 In light of that analysis, it would be tempt-
ing to conclude that Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision
can be sustained simply because its undue-hardship defense provides
"a very broad exemption from liability., 16' Like the "scrutiny" argu-
ment, however, the "defense burden" argument falls wide of the mark
because it glosses over the critical distinction between legislation that
imposes a quantitatively greater burden than the Constitution and legis-
lation that imposes a qualitatively different burden.
The ADEA fits into the former category because, even though it
prohibits more conduct than the Constitution, it prohibits the same
type of conduct-intentional discrimination. Thus, if the statutory
defense was lowered from the BFOQ standard to something closer to
the Court's rational basis standard, the ADEA might very well be
deemed congruent and proportional to the requirements of the Con-
stitution. By contrast, Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provi-
sion falls into the latter category because it imposes a substantive re-
quirement (accommodation) that is different in nature than the core
requirement of the Free Exercise Clause under Smith (nondiscrimina-
tion). 64 The mere fact that the defense to Title VI's accommodation
commitments receive better treatment than other, comparably serious commit-
ments ....
161 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
12 Id. at 87 (quotingW. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (citation omitted
in original)).
163 Holmes, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
164 See Holmes v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir.
2003) (granting rehearing en banc) (explaining that "there is a difference and a potential ten-
sion between an anti-discrimination rule and an accommodation requirement"), appeal dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), (Jan. 20, 2004).
Professor Christine Jolts has argued that accommodation and antidiscrimination should not
be treated as "fundamentally distinct" because the "disparate impact" branch of antidiscrimina-
tion doctrine already functions as an accommodation requirement when it is broadly applied.
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 651-52 (2001).
However, because disparate impact liability is not a branch of constitutional antidiscrimination
doctrine, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), it does not form part of the relevant
baseline for purposes of the Court's Section 5 analysis. Accordingly, disparate impact provisions
must themselves be tested against the Constitution's intentional discrimination baseline. See
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2001) (contrasting the ADA's dispa-
rate impact provision with the requirements of the Constitution). ProfessorJolls acknowledges
this point, but nevertheless treats disparate impact liability as an appropriate measuring stick for
other accommodation requirements because "existing doctrine holds Title VII's disparate-
impact branch to be within Congress's power under Section 5." Jolls, supra, at 677. However,
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requirement may be broad is of no significance unless it can be
shown that the requirement itself is sufficiently related to a "constitu-
tional value" that Congress has the authority to enforce. 65 And if the
only constitutional value in the Free Exercise Clause is freedom from
intentional discrimination, the requisite relationship will be difficult
to establish.
The inadequacy of focusing solely on the breadth, rather than the
nature, of a statutory defense is well illustrated by the district court's
effort in Holmes to draw an analogy between Title VII's undue-
hardship defense and the defense available to employers under the
Equal Pay Act ("EPA"),' 66 a statute that has been upheld as appropri-
ate Section 5 legislation by several courts of appeals. 67  Under the
EPA, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of gender discrimina-
tion without showing discriminatory intent, but a defendant can then
avoid liability by showing that the existing wage disparity is based on
any factor other than sex. Seizing upon the breadth of that defense,
the Holmes court offered the following analysis:
[T] he EPA allows a broad exemption from liability for any employer who
can prove a neutral explanation for a disparity in pay. As a result, the
Seventh Circuit [has] concluded that the EPA [i]s congruent to the Four-
teenth Amendment because, like the Fourteenth Amendment, the EPA
effectively targets only "employers who intentionally discriminate against
women.
that "existing doctrine" has never been approved by the Supreme Court and has only been
tested by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits since the Court announced its congruence-and-
proportionality test in City of Boerne. Id. at 673 n.151. Moreover, asJolls points out, the ration-
ale employed by one of those courts is difficult to "'take[] seriously'" as it "seem [s] to suggest an
almost airtight link between disparate impact liability and intentional discrimination." Id. at
676 (quoting Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 452).
In any event, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the disparate impact theory is itself
"fundamentally distinct" from Title VII's reasonable-accommodation requirement. Whereas
the former only applies when an employment practice systematically disadvantages an entire
group of people, the latter can be triggered by the needs of an individual employee. Cf City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 (contrasting RFRA's accommodation requirement with disparate impact
theory and observing that "[w]hen the exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental
way by a law of general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have been bur-
dened any more than other citizens").
165 See Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 117, at 142 (recognizing that, at the very least, the
congruence-and-proportionality test limits Congress's Section 5 power "to those areas the Court
has identified (or is prepared to identify) as implicating the constitutional values that inhere in
the Fourteenth Amendment").
1 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
167 See Cherry v. Univ. of Wis. Sys. Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2001); Hundertmark
v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272 (lth Cir. 2000); O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965
(8th Cir. 1999); Ussery v. Louisiana ex rel. La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 150 F.3d 431 (5th Cir.
1998).
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The Court concludes that the same is true with respect to Title VII,
which also contains a very broad exemption from liability for employ-
168
ers.
The fatal flaw in this reasoning is that Title VII, unlike the EPA, does
not exempt "any employer who can prove a neutral explanation" for
its behavior. Quite the opposite, Tide VII's reasonable-
accommodation requirement by definition contemplates nonneutral
treatment, and a genuine desire to treat all employees equally is not a
defense. 69
Equally unpersuasive is the district court's attempt in Holmes to
bolster its reasoning by posing the following rhetorical question: "If
the employer cannot show that an accommodation would have in-
volved anything more than a de minimis cost, what explanation can
there be for the employer's conduct other than that some invidious
purpose is probably at work?, 170  Contrary to the court's implicit as-
sumption, there are a number of noncost, nondiscriminatory reasons
why a state employer might decline to make a religious exception to a
work rule. For example, a state employer might simply wish to avoid
favoritism in the workplace. Indeed, in most contexts, we want the
government to avoid favoritism, especially religious favoritism, and it
seems quite odd to conclude that a state employer who does just that
should be presumed to have engaged in "invidious" discrimination.
7'
In addition, the Holmes court overlooks a number of other possible
rationales, ranging from the all-too-common bureaucratic response
IM See 184 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (citation omitted) (quoting Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d
927, 934 (7th Cir. 2000)).
160 See Holmes, 349 F.3d at 921 (explaining that "accommodation requires consciousness of
religion and entails a demand that believers and nonbelievers receive different treatment").
A better, though not perfect, analogy would be to the FMLA, which requires employers to
accommodate certain family and medical needs of employees by providing twelve weeks of un-
paid leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000). Even though the FMLA does not contain an
equality of treatment defense, the Supreme Court recently upheld the FMLA's family care pro-
vision as appropriate Section 5 legislation. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct.
1972 (2003). However, the Court rested its decision in Hibbs on the fact that Congress drafted
the FMIA in response to a continuing pattern of sex discrimination that represented a "'diffi-
cult and intractable problem'" necessitating "added prophylactic measures." Id. at 1982 (quot-
ing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,88 (2000)). The Court is not likely to apply a simi-
lar rationale in the religion context. See City of Boe-ne, 521 U.S. at 530 (observing that RFRA's
extensive legislative history contains no episodes of religious discrimination "occurring in the
past 40 years"); Holmes, 349 F.3d at 919-20 (refusing to extend Hibbs and explaining that reli-
gious discrimination by states "does not have the same history as discrimination on account of
race or sex").
170 Holmes, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
171 Cf Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 (1986) (plurality opinion) (arguing that when reli-
gious exemptions from a government requirement are requested, "legitimate interests are im-
plicated in the need to avoid any appearance of favoring religious over nonreligious appli-
cants").
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that "this is the way we do things,",7 2 to the perhaps more thoughtful
concern that making one exemption from a work rule will set a
precedent and make it harder to deny future exemptions, whether
religious or not."
In the end, the court's conclusion in Holmes that the reasonable-
accommodation provision "targets" intentional discrimination is
based on a wholly unfounded assumption that state employers who
deny accommodations are likely to have invidious motives. More-
over, the court's assumption appears to be in tension with the legisla-
tive history of the reasonable-accommodation provision. During his
floor speech in support of the provision, Senator Randolph, the chief
proponent of the measure, never expressed a belief that employers
were denying accommodations out of religious bias. Rather, he
stated: "I think that usually the persons on both sides of this situation,
the employer and the employee, are of an understanding frame of
mind and heart. I do not think they try to present problems. I do
not think they try to have abrasiveness come into these decisions."
74
That view finds support in the facts of the lead pre-amendment case
Senator Randolph placed in the record, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.
7 5
In Dewey, the employer "did endeavor to make accommodation," and
simply would not go as far as the employee desired. 176 Likewise, in the
only other case placed in the record, Riley v. Bendix Corp., 177 the court.. .. orP17"  r
observed that there was no evidence of discrimination, and found
that the burden on the plaintiffs religion was "simply an incident" of
a rule "applied uniformly to all employees no matter what their reli-
gious affiliation happened to be."' Against that background, Title
VII's reasonable-accommodation provision is best understood as a
measure targeting incidental burdens, not intentional discrimina-
tion.'8°
17" Cf Volokh, supra note 59, at 1484 (observing that RFRA's supporters hoped it "would give
reliious objectors a tool to fight rigid-thinking petty bureaucrats").
See Amar, supra note 15, at 519 (observing that the fear of "'setting a precedent of
granting exceptions'" is "often asserted as a reason for denying" an accommodation but does
not qualify as an undue hardship).
174 118 CONG. REC. 705, 706 (Jan. 21, 1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
175 429 F.2d 324 (1970), reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. at 706.
176 429 F.2d at 335.
177 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972), reprinted in 118
CONG. REC. at 711.
178 330 F. Supp. at 589-90.
179 Id. at 589.
I80 Cf City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (discussing how the legislative his-
tory of RFRA reveals that Congress was concerned about "laws of general applicability which
place incidental burdens on religion," not "'deliberate persecution'" (quoting Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 1991, Hearings on H. R. 2797 before the Subcomm. on Civil and Con-
stitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 331-334 (1993)
(statement of Douglas Laycock)); Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 117, at 134 ("In its brief and
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It bears repeating that Congress's effort to minimize incidental
burdens on religious employees was wholly consistent with the
Court's free exercise jurisprudence in 1972, when the reasonable-
accommodation provision was enacted. '81 Nevertheless, the Court's
doctrine has since changed, and the broad accommodation require-
ments of Sherbert and Yoder have been replaced by the less accommo-
dation-friendly Smith rule. Given that development, it is not alto-
gether surprising that the district court in Holmes sought to
reformulate Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision as a
measure targeting the Constitution's undisputed prohibition of in-
tentional discrimination. But as the above discussion reveals, there is
no reason to believe that state employers affected by the reasonable-
accommodation requirement are necessarily engaged in such dis-
crimination.
Fortunately for those defending the reasonable-accommodation
provision under Section 5, there is an alternative to the intentional
discrimination argument. The better option is to seize upon the fact
that, even under Smith, the Court has not quite moved to a "religion-
blind" Free Exercise Clause. Rather, the Court still requires religious
accommodation under certain circumstances, and the fate of Title
VII's reasonable-accommodation provision will likely depend on how
closely it can be tied to those circumstances.
B. Reasonable Accommodation, the Smith Exceptions, and the Vagaries of
"Congruence and Proportionality"
To determine whether Title VII appropriately enforces the free
exercise accommodation requirements that have survived Smith, it is
first necessary to ascertain the health of the survivors. As discussed in
Part II, although the Smith Court recognized two exceptions to its
general rule rejecting free exercise accommodations, one of those
exceptions-the hybrid-rights rule-has been roundly criticized as
unprincipled and unworkable, and there is good reason to doubt that
182the Court will actually apply it in the future. By contrast, the sec-
ond Smith exception-the selective-exemption rule-has found con-
183siderable favor among lower courts and commentators, and was re-
affirmed by the Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah. 184 Given those circumstances, the focus of the following
in oral argument before the Court, the United States attempted to characterize RFRA as a re-
medial measure aimed at rooting out intentional discrimination that might not be captured by
the Smith test. This characterization is more than a little implausible .. . .") (footnote omitted).
181 See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
184 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
[Vol. 6:3
MEDERALISM AND FREE EXERCISE
analysis will be on whether Title VII's reasonable-accommodation
provision can be upheld as a measure that appropriately enforces the
selective-exemption rule.
A Section 5 inquiry into the relationship between the reasonable-
accommodation provision and the selective-exemption rule would
require the Court to confront several unresolved issues. First, the
Court would have to clarify the scope of the selective-exemption rule
in order to determine how often that rule is likely to be implicated in
state employment cases covered by Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision. Second, the Court would have to decide
whether the degree of overlap between the reasonable-
accommodation provision and the selective-exemption rule satisfies
the vague standard announced in City of Boerne, that is, whether there
is "reason to believe" that "many" of the state employment decisions
affected by the reasonable-accommodation provision will have a "sig-
nificant likelihood" of being deemed unconstitutional under the se-
lective-exemption rule.8 5 Finally, even if that standard is met, the
Court would have to determine whether the reasonable-
accommodation provision can be deemed appropriate enforcement
legislation despite the lack of any evidence in the legislative record of
unconstitutional state action.
Based on a review of those issues, this Article concludes that the
Court can and should uphold Title VII's reasonable-accommodation
requirement under Section 5. The question, however, is much closer
than many might like to admit.
1. Selective Exemptions and State Employment
The basic thrust of the selective-exemption rule is that govern-
ment officials should not be permitted to make value judgments that
18"6disfavor religious practices as compared to similar secular practices.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has instructed that when "individu-
alized exemptions from a general requirement are available, the gov-
ernment 'may not refuse to extend that system to cases of "religious
hardship" without compelling reason.' 18 7 By presumptively requiring
religious exemptions when other exemptions are available, the
Court's rule ensures that state officials do not "devalue[] religious
reasons... by judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious
reasons."188
185 521 U.S. at 532.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
187 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986))).
188 Id. at 537-38.
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The Court has only discussed the selective-exemption rule on two
occasions,'89 and is unclear whether the rule only covers situations in
which the government makes individualized exemptions, or more
broadly applies to situations involving categorical exemptions. Reso-
lution of that issue is necessary to determine how often the selective-
exemption rule is likely to arise in the state employment context. In-
terestingly enough, the lead lower court decision addressing the is-
sue, Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark,'90
arose in the employment context.
Newark Lodge concerned a police department policy that prohib-
ited uniformed officers from wearing beards, but included a cate-
gorical exemption for officers who had medical reasons for not shav-
ing. 9' When two officers whose religious beliefs prohibited them
from shaving were denied similar exemptions, they brought suit and
argued that the police department's policy "devalued their religious
reasons for wearing beards by judging them to be of lesser import
than medical reasons." The Third Circuit agreed, and gave the fol-
lowing explanation for why categorical exemptions should be treated
similarly to individualized exemptions:
While the Supreme Court did speak in terms of "individualized exemp-
tions" in Smith and Lukumi, it is clear from those decisions that the
Court's concern was the prospect of the government's deciding that secu-
lar motivations are more important than religious motivations. If any-
thing, this concern is only further implicated when the government does
not merely create a mechanism for individualized exemptions, but in-
stead, actually creates a categorical exemption for individuals with a secu-
lar objection but not for individuals with a religious objection.
193
Consistent with that reasoning, the court found that "the medical
exemption raises concern because it indicates that the Department
189 See id.; Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 ("[O]ur decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the
proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not re-
fuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason." (quoting
Ray, 476 U.S. at 708)). Prior to Smith, a three-justice plurality of the Court had endorsed the
selective-exemption rule in Roy, 476 U.S. at 708 (Burger, CJ., joined by Powell and Rehnquist,
JJ.) ("If a state creates [a mechanism for individual exemptions], its refusal to extend an exemp-
tion to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent.") In addition, Justice
Stevens expressed views consistent with the selective-exemption rule in three pre-Smith cases.
See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 147-48 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Roy, 476 U.S. at 721-22 & n.17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result) ("To the extent that other.. . applicants are, in fact, offered excep-
tions and special assistance in response to their inability to 'provide' required information, it
would seem that a religious inability should be given no less deference."); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 263-64 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment).
190 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
191 Id. at 360.
192 Id. at 365.
193 Id.
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has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., medical) motivations
for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its general in-
terest in uniformity but that religious motivations are not."'
Although Newark Lodge has been embraced by a number of schol-
ars who believe that it represents a logical extension of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Smith and Lukumi9  others are more skeptical. 96
The principal arguments against the broad Newark Lodge approach
are (1) that it is too far-reaching because "virtually all laws ... contain
many secular exemptions, " 97 (2) that it prevents legislatures from
promoting the common good by favoring particularly beneficial secu-
lar activities over all other activities, whether secular or religious,9
and (3) that categorical exemptions are less likely to be the product
of discrimination than are "discretionary, case-by-case decisions made
by unelected officials."'9 9 As shown below, all three arguments are in
tension with the Supreme Court's decision in Lukumi.
194 Id. at 366. The policy also included an exemption for undercover officers, but the court
found that exemption to be irrelevant because it did not undermine the purpose of the no-
beard policy, which was to foster a "uniform appearance" among those officers who were "'held
out to the public as law enforcement person[nel].'" Id. (quoting Reply Brief at 9); see Gedicks,
supra note 112, at 119 ("Religion is treated unequally only if nonexempted religious conduct is
in the same relationship to the purpose of a law as exempted secular conduct."); cf Swanson v.
Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 697-98 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1998) (suggesting in
dicta that secular exemptions do render a rule nonneutral towards religion when the exemp-
tions are consistent with the purpose of the rule).
195 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 108, at 872-74 ("[The Newark Lodgejudge's] excellent opinion
closely tracked the reasoning of Lukumi regarding underinclusiveness as the key to locating the
boundary between general applicability and non-general applicability."); Douglas Laycock, The
Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 31-33 (2000) (opining that the distinction
between individualized and categorical exceptions "makes no sense," and praising the Newark
Lodge decision as "promising").
See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Free Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and Why?, 33 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 95, 109 (2001) (finding the extension of the selective-exemption rule to categorical
exemptions "plausible and potentially attractive," but expressing "doubt that the Supreme
Court's free exercise doctrine stretches" so far).
Prior to Newark Lodge, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits rejected efforts to apply the selec-
tive-exemption rule to situations where the only exemptions permitted by the government cov-
ered "entire, objectively-defined categories." Am. Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh,
961 F.2d 1405, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving exemptions to an immigration reporting law
for independent contractors, household employees, and employees hired prior to November
1986); see Swanson, 135 F.3d at 701 (involving exemptions to a school board's "no-part-time-
attendance" policy for fifth-year seniors and special education students). However, because
American Friends was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lukumi, and because
Swanson involved exemptions that did not undermine the purpose of the general rule in that
case, see id. at 697-98 & n.3, it is not clear that either case is squarely in conflict with Newark
Lodge. See supra note 194.
Volokh, supra note 59, at 1540.
198 See id. at 1540-42 (arguing that it "may be perfectly proper" for a legislature to value "'the
exempted secular activities more highly' than the religious activities" (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 51)).
99 Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Ex-
ceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1081 (2000). But see Cedicks, supra note 112, at 118
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First, with respect to the ubiquity of categorical exemptions, the
Lukumi Court explicitly recognized that "[a]ll laws are selective to
some extent," but nevertheless concluded that "categories of selec-
tion are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of
burdening religious practice. 2 0 0 The Court went on explain that the
four city ordinances at issue in Lukumi were underinclusive because
they failed to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangered the
city's interests "in a similar or greater degree" than the prohibited re-
ligious conduct.0 l Admittedly, the Court found the underinclusion
in Lukumi to be particularly troubling because the combined effect of
the four ordinances was to exempt all but a few nonreligious activi-
ties. 2  However, the Court was careful to point out that the city's con-
duct fell "well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First
Amendment rights."2 0 3 Indeed, even when the Court focused on one
particular ordinance that contained only a single categorical ex-
emption, it still faulted the city for failing to explain why the ex-
empted conduct did not implicate the purposes of the ordinance to
the same degree as the covered religious conduct. 20 4 Notably, the
Court nowhere indicated that such underinclusive burdening of re-
ligion could be tolerated simply because many laws are underinclu-
sive.
The argument that the government should be permitted to value
select secular activities more highly than other activities, including re-
ligious activities, is undermined by Lukumi's treatment of the city of
Hialeah's decision to make exemptions to its animal cruelty ordi-
nance for "hunting, slaughter of animals for food, eradication of in-
sects and pests, and euthanasia. ",20 5 The Court held that exempting
such conduct while refusing to exempt ritual sacrifices impermissibly
"devalue [d] religious reasons for killing b0 judging them to be of
lesser import than nonreligious reasons." 06 Moreover, the Court
(arguing that the reasoning underlying the individualized-exemption rule "need not be con-
fined to situations in which government actors exercise administrative discretion").
200 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993).
201 Id. at 543; see also id. at 546 ("The proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to
analogous nonreligious conduct....").
202 See id. at 543 ("[T]he ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those oc-
casioned by religious sacrifice.").
203 Id. (emphasis added).
204 See id. at 545. The Court discussed the single-exemption ordinance in two separate sec-
tions of its opinion, one on "neutrality," and the other on "general applicability." Id. at 532,
539-40, 542, 545. In the neutrality section, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether
the single-exemption ordinance "could survive constitutional scrutiny if it existed separately."
Id. at 540. However, in the "general applicability" section, the Court concluded that "allfour
ordinances [were] overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects." Id. at 546 (emphasis
added).
205 Id. at 537.
206 Id. at 537-38.
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found the exemptions to be problematic even though they were in-
corporated from laws passed by the Florida legislature, and the Court
rejected out of hand the argument that food consumption, pest con-
trol, and euthanasia could be treated as "'obviously"' more "'impor-
tant"' and "'justified"' than animal sacrifice. °7
Finally, the contention that the selective-exemption rule can be
limited to discretionary decisions made by unelected bureaucrats ig-
nores the fact that the Lukumi Court applied the rule to decisions
made by the elected attorney general of Florida and the elected
council members of the city of Hialeah . Of course, one could at-
tempt to narrow the contention by jettisoning the "unelected bu-
reaucrat" element and focusing solely on the "discretionary decision"
element. However, even such a modified argument would be in ten-
sion with Lukumi, which nowhere focuses on the dangers of discre-
tionary decision making, and instead expresses a more general con-
cern about government actions that devalue religious activities by
treating them less favorably than secular activities. As the Third Cir-
cuit observed in Newark Lodge, the Supreme Court's concern would
appear to be no less implicated by the categorical favoring of secular
activities than by the discretionary favoring of such activities.0 9
In the end, although Lukumi does not compel the conclusion that
the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions for religious conduct
whenever the government makes categorical exemptions for compa-
rable conduct, it does provide considerable support for that conclu-





approach, it is likely that the selective-exemption rule would often be
implicated in the state employment context.
For example, whenever leave and attendance policies make allow-
ances for family obligations, as is increasingly common," the failure
207 Id. at 544 (quoting Respondents' Brief at 21); see also Duncan, supra note 108, at 875
("The decision of the legislature to value secular conduct that is not expressly protected by the
constitution more than analogous religiously motivated conduct is precisely the kind of unequal
treatment that should be the minimum standard for constitutional protection of the free exer-
cise of religion.").
208 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537.
209 Notably, in applying the selective-exemption rule, the Lukumi Court relied on a prior
opinion by Justice Stevens indicating that when regulations provide categorical exemptions for
individuals "with mental, physical, and linguistic handicaps," those with "a religious inability
should be given no less deference." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 721-22 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in result), cited in Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 538. Against that
background, the Third Circuit's holding in Newark Lodge that a categorical exemption for medi-
cal inability must be matched by an exemption for religious inability hardly seems extraordi-
na7r0Duncan, supra note 108, at 880 & n.191 (contending that "religious practice is entitled to
a kind of most-favored-nation status" under Lukumz).
211 See, e.g., National Partnership for Women & Families, State Family Leave Benefit Initiatives in
the 2001-2002 State Legislatures: Making Family Leave More Affordable ("At least 40 states have laws
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to make comparable allowances for religious obligations would be
subject to heightened scrutiny. The same would be true whenever
dress codes or grooming rules include medical exemptions,212 but not
religious exemptions, or whenever special breaks are permitted for
smokers,1  but not for religious adherents. Thus, under the "cate-
gorical exemption" approach, a strong argument could be made that
the Free Exercise Clause itself would require accommodation in
many of the same situations affected by Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision.
If, however, the Court were to limit the selective-exemption rule
to situations involving individualized rather than categorical exemp-
tions, the universe of accommodation claims implicating the Free
Exercise Clause would be more limited. As to what might remain in
that universe, there are two principal answers. First, the narrower
rule would still apply when, by policy or practice, managers and su-
pervisors are given discretion to make individualized adjustments to
workplace rules on a case-by-case basis. Second, the narrower rule
might be triggered during the disciplinary appeal process where state
employers typically must show "cause" for disciplining employees.214
Turning to the first category, intuition might suggest that there
will be many situations in which managers and supervisors will make
discretionary allowances for individual employees. And with respect
to certain matters, such as excusing occasional tardiness, that
or regulations allowing public employees to use sick leave to care for certain sick family mem-
bers."), at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004); 1 Collec-
tive Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 14:1303 (Sept. 11, 1997) ("In an effort to accommodate
family obligations, a growing number of contracts allow workers to use some of their paid sick
leave to care for family members."); 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 180:1907
(Dec. 16, 1999) (describing a sick leave/family care provision in a contract covering employees
at Pennsylvania State University). The trend toward accommodating family needs in collective
bargaining agreements is significant because approximately thirty-five percent of state employ-
ees are represented by unions. See Data on Union Membership in 2002 by Industry, Occupation,
State, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 26, 2003, at E-1, E-3.
212 See e.g. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-208.101(2) (e) (2000) (providing a medical exemp-
tion to a no-facial-hair rule for state correctional employees); Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d
11, 11-12 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1993) (describing a Massachusetts State Police Department policy that
prohibited facial hair, but contained a medical exemption); 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOT.
& CONT. (BNA) 180:705 (Sept. 6, 2001) (describing a contract provision at the University of San
Francisco that requires medical exemptions from a dress code).
213 See, e.g., North Carolina Department of Transportation, Smoking Policy ("Employees should
be allowed reasonable time to go to [designated smoking areas] for smoking."), at
http://www.ncdot.org/services/personnel/manualandpolicies/hrmanua/Word/SMOKINGP
OLICY.doc (last visited Feb. 27, 2004); California Department of Personnel Administration,
State Policies ("'Smoke breaks' usually are permitted at the discretion of the supervisor in lieu of
the time regularly allotted for breaks and rest periods."), at http://www.dpa.ca.gov/
benefits/general/orientation/orie3.shtm (last modified Nov. 12, 2003).
214 1 ISIDORE SILVER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE AND DISCIPLINE 237 (3d ed. 2001) ("Cause
is the key concept in the law of public employment discipline and discharge.").
[Vol. 6:3
M2DERALISM AND FREE EXERCISE
supposition is probably correct. "15 Less clear, however, is how often
supervisors will have discretion to make individualized exemptions
from the types of workplace rules commonly challenged under Title
VII's reasonable-accommodation provision, such as rules governing
scheduling, leave, and employee appearance. In the state employ-
ment context, the contours of those rules will often be established by
collective bargaining agreements or state law, and the notion that su-
pervisors will frequently be given discretion to act contrary to those
authorities is far from intuitive.1 6 Moreover, intuition aside, it could
prove difficult as a practical matter to establish in litigation that such
discretionary exemptions are routinely made in state workplaces.
Unlike categorical exemptions, which can be readily identified in ex-
isting collective bargaining agreements and state laws, discretionary
exemptions are largely a matter of informal practice, not written pol-
icy. Thus, in the absence of any congressional findings about the
informal practices of state employers, the Court might be reluctant to
conclude that state managers and supervisors are particularly likely to
make discretionary exemptions from the types of workplace rules af-
fected by Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision.
That leaves the argument that individualized exemptions are
regularly made in the state employment context due to use of the
"cause" standard in disciplinary proceedings. On the surface, that
argument is appealing because it seems reminiscent of the Smith
Court's treatment of the "good cause" standard used in the unem-
ployment compensation context. In Smith, the Court explained that
because unemployment compensation programs typically permit in-
dividuals to reject work for good cause, a "distinctive feature" of those
programs "is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the
particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment."2 1 7 In
other words, the good cause standard constitutes a "'mechanism for
individualized exemptions"' from the general requirement that bene-
ficiaries accept available work .
Based on Smith, one could argue that the "cause" standard in state
disciplinary proceedings constitutes a mechanism for individualized
exemptions because it invites "consideration of the particular circum-
stances" behind an employee's discipline.
215 See FRANK ZEIDLER, MANAGEMENT'S RIGHTS UNDER PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 30 (1980) ("It is sometimes the practice of management to excuse
tardiness when the excuse offered seems reasonable to the immediate supervisor.").
216 But cf Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1474 n.26 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing a
situation in which ad hoc scheduling adjustments were made to accommodate the personal
needs of individual employees).
217 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
218 Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
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However, despite the surface appeal of the analogy between the
unemployment compensation context and the employee discipline
context, the analogy ultimately breaks down because the "particular
circumstances" being analyzed in the two contexts are fundamentally
different. In unemployment compensation proceedings, the "good
cause" standard is used to judge the merits of an employee's reason for
refusing to work. By contrast, in disciplinary proceedings, the "cause"
standard is used to judge the merits of an employer's grounds for disci-
plining an employee. In the latter context, once it is determined that
certain conduct (such as chronic absenteeism or refusal to comply
with work rules) constitutes cause for discipline, an employee's per-
sonal motivation for engaging in that conduct does not entitle the
employee to an exemption from discipline. Thus, the decision maker
is not put in the position of weighing the value of religious reasons
for employee conduct versus other personal reasons, and the princi-
pal concern animating the selective-exemption theory is not impli-
cated.
In sum, if the Court declines to interpret the selective-exemption
rule as covering situations involving categorical exemptions, it could
be difficult to demonstrate congruence and proportionality between
the selective-exemption rule and Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision. By contrast, if the Court does interpret
the selective-exemption rule as covering categorical exemptions, as
Lukumi appears to foreshadow, a strong argument could be made
that the rule will often be implicated when religious accommodations
are denied in state workplaces. The Court would then have to ad-
dress the question of "how often is often enough" to demonstrate suf-
ficient congruence and proportionality under Section 5.
2. Deciphering "Congruence and Proportionality"
The Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence indicates that the ba-
sic test for determining if federal legislation is congruent and propor-
tional to the Constitution is whether there is "reason to believe" that
"many" of the state actions affected by the legislation have a "signifi-
cant likelihood of being unconstitutional."2 9 To date, however, the
Court has not had to struggle with the precise meaning of that stan-
dard because it has primarily dealt with legislation that has
219 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (concluding that "it simply cannot be
said that 'many of [the acts of infringement] affected by the congressional enactment have a
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional'" (alteration in original) (quoting City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 532)).
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prohibited "very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional. '20
Thus, to determine whether Title VII's reasonable-accommodation
provision constitutes appropriate enforcement legislation, the Court
will have to engage in a more thorough application of its congruence-
and-proportionality test than it has in prior cases.
Looking first at the "significant likelihood of unconstitutionality"
aspect of the test, there can be little doubt that a state employer's
failure to make a reasonable accommodation will have a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional in those situations where the se-
lective-exemption rule is implicated and heightened scrutiny is ap-
plied. Indeed, in those circumstances, Title VII provides less protec-
tion to an employee than the Constitution because, as interpreted by
the Court, the undue-hardship standard is considerably easier for a
state employer to meet than the compelling interest standard em-
ployed in the Court's selective-exemption cases. Moreover, even if
the Court were to conclude that it should apply an intermediate level
of scrutiny in free exercise cases arising in the public employment
context, as it has done in certain free speech cases arising in that con-
text,22' the constitutional inquiry would still be more demanding than
the Title VII inquiry because the undue-hardship standard is best un-
derstood as imposing "something in between mere rationality review
and intermediate scrutiny."
22
Once it is determined that there is a significant likelihood of un-
constitutionality when a failure to make a reasonable accommodation
implicates the selective-exemption rule, the key question becomes
whether there is "reason to believe" that "many" failures to accom-
modate will implicate the selective-exemption rule. The answer to
that question is far from self-evident. For example, the material cited
in the previous section indicates that states are increasingly making
accommodations for employees' family needs by permitting liberal
use of sick leave, and it appears that forty states make at least some
level of accommodation through the use of sick leave.2  Is that
enough to conclude that "many" state practices affected by Title VII's
reasonable-accommodation provision will also implicate the selective-
220 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000); see supra notes 133-41 and accompany-
ing text.
221 See Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citation omitted):
[W]e believe that the Supreme Court might well adopt, for free exercise cases that arise
in the context of public employment, an analysis like the one enunciated in Pickering v.
Board of Education. That case dealt with free speech rather than the free exercise of relig-
ion, but... we see no essential relevant differences between those rights ....
See also Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366
n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[W]e will assume that an intermediate level of scrutiny applies since this
case arose in the public employment context....").
222 Amar, supra note 15, at 519.
23 See supra note 211.
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exemption rule? If not, is the threshold crossed when one adds the
fact that some state employers make medical exemptions to their
dress codes and grooming rules?2 2 4 Or when one adds the evidence
that some state employers provide special accommodations for smok-
ers?
2 25
In the end, the difficulty of determining when exactly "less-than-
many" becomes "many" militates in favor of using the "reason to be-
lieve" aspect of the Court's congruence-and-proportionality test to
give Congress the benefit of the doubt in close Section 5 cases. If the
Court truly believes what it has repeatedly stated-that Congress is
entitled to "'wide latitude"' when enforcing constitutional rights2 26-
the congruence-and-proportionality test should not be used to en-
force some arbitrary, fixed definition of "many" developed by the
Court. Rather, so long as one could reasonably believe that "many" of
the state actions affected by a piece of legislation will involve the req-
uisite circumstances, a sufficient predicate for enforcement legisla-
tion should be found.227 Applying that approach to the state em-
ployment context, where the practice of granting selective
exemptions is not an isolated occurrence, but rather is formalized in
a number of different states through laws and collective bargaining
agreements covering significant numbers of employees, one could
certainly hold a reasonable belief that many of the state employment
decisions affected by Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision
24 See supra note 212.
225 See supra note 213.
226 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 520 (1997)); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (same).
27 The approach advocated in this Article-which accepts the Court's jurisprudence as the
baseline for the congruence-and-proportionality test, and merely grants Congress leeway on the
quasi-factual "many" question-is considerably more modest than what others have sought from
the legislative branch. For example, as discussed above, some have argued that the level of ju-
dicial scrutiny the Court applies to particular state conduct should not necessarily be used as a
measuring stick for Section 5 legislation because institutional constraints sometimes lead the
Court to adopt standards that underprotect constitutional rights. See supra note 157. Others
have gone farther and argued that Congress should, within reason, be permitted to pass legisla-
tion that is premised on a different substantiveview of the Constitution than is adhered to by the
Court. See McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 33, at 156 (contending that
Congress should be permitted to adopt a different "interpretation" of the Constitution than the
Court, so long as it chooses "from among the textually and historically plausible meanings of
the clause in question"); TRIBE, supra note 126, at 961 ("[I]t may not make much sense to speak
of the meaning of a given constitutional provision; one may instead have to talk about a set of
plausible meanings, with a different subset corresponding to each of the key legal institutions
empowered to ascribe meaning to the provision for purposes peculiar to that legal institution's
work.") (emphasis in original). By contrast, the analysis in this Article assumes that Section 5
legislation should be judged by reference to the Court's own judicial tests and constitutional
interpretations, and simply argues for deference when applying that analytical framework.
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will involve selective exemptions and, thus, implicate the Court's free
exercise jurisprudence.2
Further bolstering the argument in favor of Title VII is the fact
that, even in those situations where Title VII affects conduct that does
not implicate the selective-exemption rule, the burden imposed on
states by Title ViI's reasonable-accommodation provision is quite
modest. Unlike RFRA, which "pervasively prohibit[ed] constitutional
state action" by imposing "the most demanding test known to consti-
tutional law" whenever states declined to make religious accommoda-
tions to generally applicable laws,229 Title VII only requires state em-
ployers to make accommodations when they can be achieved at a de
minimis cost. Rather than imposing a broad duty to make "'religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable
kind,"'2 Title VII merely requires accommodation in the employ-
ment context, and then only in limited circumstances. Thus, it does
not have the type of "sweeping coverage, 23 ' and "indiscriminate
scope 2 3 2 that has characterized the laws considered in the Court's
233previous Section 5 cases.
228 If the Court were writing on a clean Section 5 slate, an argument could be made that it
should judge the appropriateness of enforcement legislation on an "as applied" basis. Under
such an approach, the reasonable-accommodation provision would not be deemed valid in all
its applications simply because many applications arise in contexts involving selective-
exemptions. Rather, the provision would only be deemed valid in those cases that actually in-
volve selective exemptions. Whatever the merits of the as applied approach, it has been es-
chewed by the Court, which has exclusively used the "facial" congruence-and-proportionality
test in recent years. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1985-86 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (faulting the Court for failing to supplement its congruence-and-
proportionality test with an as applied inquiry); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 653-54 & n.4 (1999) (StevensJ, dissenting) (faulting the Court
for failing to perform an as-applied analysis). See generally Catherine Carroll, Note, Section Five
Overbreadth: The Facial Approach to Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1026, 1034-44 (2003).
On a related note, the Court's recent Section 5 decisions have contained no discussion of
"severability" issues, prompting concerns that the Court's new approach might not allow for
distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate provisions in the same statute. See id. at
1053-58, 1064-65. However, such concerns appear to have been obviated by the Court's deci-
sion in Hibbs, which found the FMLA's "family-care provision" to be appropriate under Section
5 without addressing the propriety of three other leave provisions in the FMLA. See 123 S. Ct.
1972, 1976, 1984 (addressing only 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), and not 29 U.S.C. §§
2612(a) (1)(A), (B), and (D)); see also Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1) (D) to be inappropriate without addressing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a) (1) (A),
(B), and (C)). As relevant here, the Court's approach in Hibbs indicates that Title VII's reason-
able-accommodation provision should be judged separately from Title VII's other provisions.
229 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-34.
230 Id. at 534 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)).
2.'1 Id. at 532.
232 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2001).
233 See Holmes v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir.
2003) (granting rehearing en banc) (finding that the reasonable-accommodation provision
satisfies the "proportionality element" of the congruence-and-proportionality test because it
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In sum, because there is reason to believe that many of the state
employment decisions affected by Title VII's reasonable-
accommodation provision will implicate the selective-exemption rule,
and because the burden imposed on state employers by the reason-
able-accommodation provision is far from onerous, the Court should
conclude that the provision is both congruent and proportional to
the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. That, however, may
not be enough.
3. The Curious Role of the Legislative Record
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Court's recent Section 5
jurisprudence is the impression given in Garrett that an objective find-
ing of congruence and proportionality will not be sufficient to sustain
a piece of legislation if the legislative record lacks evidence of Con-
gress's subjective intent.34  A strict legislative record requirement
would spell certain doom for Title VII's reasonable-accommodation
provision as there is absolutely no evidence that Congress, which en-
acted the provision in 1972, was attempting to enforce the Court's se-
lective-exemption rule, which was not articulated until 1986, and was
not approved by a majority of the Court until 1990.
Nonetheless, there is hope for Title VII. Although Garrett indi-
cates that an adequate legislative record is a prerequisite for all pro-
phylactic legislation, Kimel states quite clearly that it is not.235  And if
ever there was a situation demonstrating why the Court should
choose the Kimel approach over the Garrett approach, it is that of the
reasonable-accommodation provision.
When Congress first passed the reasonable-accommodation provi-
sion, it would have had no reason to think that it needed to support
its action with explicit findings in the legislative record. For one
thing, the Court at that time did not impose a legislative record re-
quirement, and it would not so much as mention one for another
"demands much less" of states than RFRA), appeal dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 42(b), (Jan. 20, 2004). Notwithstanding its conclusion on proportionality, the Holmes
court determined that the reasonable-accommodation provision is not appropriate Section 5
legislation because it is not "congruent" to the Free Exercise Clause's prohibition of intentional
discrimination. Id. at 628-30. However, the Holmes court did not consider the argument, devel-
oped here, that the reasonable-accommodation provision is congruent to the Supreme Court's
selective-exemption rule.
234 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001) (reviewing the
legislative record and stating that Section 5 legislation "must be based" on a "pattern of uncon-
stitutional discrimination"); id. at 374 (stating that "there must be a pattern of discrimination by
the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress
must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation") (emphasis added).
235 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (stating that a "lack of support" in the legislative record "is not
determinative of the § 5 inquiry").
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twenty-seven years. Many have noted the unfairness of imposing a
legislative record requirement retroactively,2 3 6 as well as the oddity of
its embrace by justices who generally eschew reliance on legislative
history,237 but those observations appear to have fallen on deaf ears.
However, the tension is heightened considerably in the case of the
reasonable-accommodation provision because the Court's underlying
substantive law was also different in 1972. Thus, even if Congress had
known about the legislative record requirement at that time, it would
not have had reason to be concerned about that requirement be-
cause the reasonable-accommodation provision did not prohibit a
"broader swath of conduct" than the Court's then-existing free exer-
cise jurisprudence. It was only after the Smith Court changed the law
in 1990, and disavowed the notion that religious exemptions are gen-
erally required, that there was any reason to believe that the reason-
able-accommodation provision might go beyond the requirements of
the Free Exercise Clause and, thus, need to be justified by legislative
findings.
Given that chronology, the following passage from City of Boerne-
in which the Court chided Congress for not paying proper attention
to its precedents-takes on an ironic significance:
When the political branches of the Government act against the back-
ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles,
238including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
When Congress enacted Title VII's reasonable-accommodation
provision, it acted "against the background of a judicial interpreta-
tion" characterized by Sherbert and Yoder, and it is the Court, not Con-
gress, that has since failed to treat those precedents with the "respect
due them under settled principles."
Nonetheless, had the Court been willing to overturn Sherbert and
Yoder in Smith, irony would not be a sufficient basis for upholding a
law that could no longer be viewed as enforcing the Constitution.
The Smith Court, however, declined to overturn its prior decisions
and instead reinterpreted them as selective-exemption and hybrid-
rights cases. Having gone to such lengths to preserve its own prece-
dent, the Court is hardly in a position to condemn congressional leg-
islation that remains objectively consistent with that revised
236 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 654
(1999) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (noting requirement is "quite unfair"); Colker & Brudney, supra
note 9, at 105-17; Frickey & Smith, supra note 33, at 1723.
237 See Colker & Brudney, supra note 9, at 136-39; Frickey & Smith, supra note 33, at 1750-51.
238 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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precedent simply because Congress did not predict the Court's revi-
sions in the legislative record.
In short, Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision provides
an excellent example of why the legislative record should not be
treated as an indispensable part of every Section 5 inquiry. Because
Title VII's reasonable-accommodation requirement can be deemed
congruent and proportional to the selective-exemption rule, from an
objective point of view, it should be upheld as appropriate Section 5
legislation.
V. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (FINDING FIVE VOTES)
In the event that a state sovereign immunity challenge to Tide
VII's reasonable-accommodation provision does make its way to the
Court, litigants should be aware that much more may be at play than
the relationship between the reasonable-accommodation provision
and the Court's post-Smith free exercise jurisprudence.
For example, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which four
Justices (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer) vote to up-
hold the reasonable-accommodation provision on the ground that
the Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence should be re-
versed,2 39 and a fifth member of the Court (Justice O'Connor) votes
to uphold the reasonable-accommodation provision on the ground, 240
that the Court's decision in Smith should be reversed. On the other
hand, it is not inconceivable that one of the antisovereign immunity
Justices (Justice Stevens) would vote to strike down the reasonable-
accommodation provision on the ground that it violates the Estab-
lishment Clause.
A further complication is the EEOC's attempt to avoid Establish-
ment Clause problems by interpreting the reasonable-
accommodation provision to cover all deeply held moral and ethical
beliefs rather than just religious beliefs. Although such an interpreta-
tion would no doubt alleviate Justice Stevens's establishment con-
cerns, it might give Justice O'Connor pause because the pre-Smith
29 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 98-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part, joined
by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) ("The kind of judicial activism manifested in [the sover-
eign immunity cases] represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this Court
that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.").
240 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor,J., dissenting, joined by Breyer,J.) ("Smith is
demonstrably wrong. Moreover, it is a recent decision. As such, it has not engendered the kind
of reliance on its continued application that would militate against overruling it.").
241 See id. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that RFRA violates the Establish-
ment Clause because it grants exemptions for religion "that no atheist or agnostic can obtain").
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jurisprudence to which she adheres made clear that the Free Exercise
Clause covers only religion.242
In addition to the above considerations, one might also suspect
that at least some of the justices will have an instinctual aversion to
casting a vote against Title VII, regardless of where they may stand on
state sovereign immunity, Section 5, free exercise, or establishment.
243
Indeed, one might even suspect that the most dedicated federalists
on the Court (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) will be reluctant
to press their fight with Congress into the realm of Title VII. That
said, any intangible advantage enjoyed by Title VII could be under-
mined if Congress, with full knowledge of the Court's concerns about
religious accommodation, chooses to bolster the reasonable-
accommodation requirement by passing the WRFA.244
Putting aside the risk of compromising Title VII's aura, the en-
actment of the WRFA has the potential to both help and hurt the
cause of those who would defend the reasonable-accommodation
provision as appropriate Section 5 legislation. The upside is that
Congress presumably would have had the opportunity to develop a
detailed legislative record documenting state employment practices
that involve selective exemptions, both individualized and categori-
cal. The downside is that by raising the burden on states and requir-
ing them to provide accommodations absent a "significant difficulty,,2 5
or expense, the WRFA would make it harder to argue that the rea-
sonable-accommodation provision is a modest measure that is
unlikely to prohibit much constitutional state conduct. In addition, a
reinforced reasonable-accommodation requirement increases the risk
that Justice Stevens (and perhaps others) will be receptive to an Es-
tablishment Clause argument.
In the end, whether or not the WRFA is passed, a state sovereign
immunity challenge to Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provi-
sion would involve too many variables to allow for confident predic-
tions about how the Court might resolve the matter. Thus, although
the analysis in Part IV above suggests that the Court could use Title
ViI's reasonable-accommodation provision as a vehicle for bringing
242 See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) ("There is no doubt
that '[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause.' Purely secular
views do not suffice." (citation omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713
(1981)); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (stating that the "Free Exercise Clause
... by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (explaining that "purely secular" beliefs, "however virtuous and admi-
rable," cannot be treated as "religious beliefs").
243 Cf Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 701 (2000) (asserting that
"it is unthinkable that the Court will ever strike down damages actions under... Title VII").
244 See S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003).
245 S. 893 § 2(a) (4), 108th Cong. (2003).
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clarity to its unsettled free exercise and Section 5 doctrines, it is far
from clear that five members of the Court would agree to do so.
CONCLUSION
When Title VII's reasonable-accommodation provision was en-
acted in 1972, it was a fitting compliment to the Supreme Court's
own pro-accommodation view of the Free Exercise Clause. However,
the Court has since changed its approach, and religious accommoda-
tions are now the constitutional exception, not the rule. As a result, a
serious question arises under the Court's current federalism juris-
prudence as to whether the reasonable-accommodation provision can
be considered appropriate Section 5 legislation that abrogates state
sovereign immunity. This Article proposes that the Court answer that
question by focusing on the relationship between the reasonable-
accommodation provision and the selective-exemption rule that was
announced in Smith and reaffirmed in Lukumi. By doing so, the
Court could preserve the ability of state employees to vindicate their
rights under Title VII while bringing much needed clarity to its free
exercise and Section 5 doctrines.
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